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We study the generic problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (inspection agency) is
tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. The defender has access to a limited
number of detectors that she can randomly position in the network to monitor its components. We address the
question of determining a randomized inspection strategy with minimum number of detectors that ensures
a target expected attack detection rate. To address this question, we formulate a mathematical program
with constraints involving the Nash equilibria of a large-scale strategic game between the defender and
attacker. We develop a novel approach to construct an approximate equilibrium strategy profile of the game
by utilizing solutions of minimum set cover and maximum set packing problems. This construction can be
viewed as a generalization of some of the previously known results in security games, and is scalable to large-
scale networks. Importantly, by using game-theoretic and combinatorial arguments, we provide optimality
guarantees of our solution to the inspection problem in terms of the number of detectors and attack detection
rate. We also derive a structural result on the attack detection rate in equilibrium, which can be applied to
further improve these guarantees through a column generation procedure.
Subject classifications : Games/group decisions: noncooperative; Search and surveillance; Programming:
integer: applications.
1. Introduction
Inspection systems for monitoring critical infrastructure networks play a crucial role in ensuring
the availability and quality of essential services that rely on these networks. These systems are
responsible for providing situational awareness to the distribution utilities, who are tasked with
maintaining the functional state and service quality of their expansive assets. Reliability issues
resulting from the deterioration of age-old infrastructure (Jackson et al. 2014), combined with
threats from malicious entities such as fraudulent customers and social miscreants pose signifi-
cant problems for today’s resource-constrained utilities (Owolabi 2016). Moreover, recent cyber
incidents confirm that external hackers and adversarial nation states are capable of sabotaging
critical network components in a strategic manner (Dancy and Dancy 2017, Naureen et al. 2018).
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Such attacks, if successful, can result in prolonged service interruptions, and even pose a direct
risk to human lives. Thus, utilities companies and their customers can directly benefit from better
information systems designed for detecting a variety of incidents, both random and adversarial.
Consider the inspection problem faced by a utility company (typically a regulated monopoly)
who manages a natural gas pipeline network in an urban area. Traditionally, utility personnel
conduct inspections of network assets and customer connections at a predetermined frequency
(once every 2-3 years), or when an emergency situation is reported (McGeehan and Flegenheimer
2015). Issues such as service interruptions, minor gas leaks, and faulty/illegal line connections are
addressed by the utility with varying degrees of response rates, and notifications are filed with the
regulator retroactively. However, these traditional inspection systems, based on manual checks and
ex-post reporting, are very limited with regards to three aspects:
1) Minor incidents (leaks) occasionally evolve to become major disruptions. However, the current
inspection operations tend to prioritize major components such as main lines and valve stations.
As a result, the detection of minor leaks is delayed, often causing significant damages in the future.
2) Physical or remote access to critical components can be exploited by malicious entities. These
entities may use a combination of physical and digital tampering to bypass safety systems. However,
inspection systems typically do not account for strategic and resourceful attackers whose actions
are more difficult to detect, in comparison to isolated random failures.
3) Utilities companies are the primary entities responsible for network monitoring and incident
response. The regulator has various degrees of oversight on utilities’ response to reported incidents,
but the guidelines on proactive inspection are relatively sparse. Thus, the existing regulatory frame-
work can benefit from inspection systems that provide better sensing and reporting capabilities.
Fortunately, recent advances in sensing technologies have resulted in commercially available
smart detector systems, which include a sensor, a detection software, and a communication unit
(Chong and Kumar 2003, von Fischer et al. 2017). These detectors can be easily operated by
the utility personnel and flexibly positioned in the network to meet target inspection goals. By
adopting smart detectors in their inspection operations, the utilities can at least partly address the
aforementioned limitations (PG&E 2010). Our article is motivated by this technological trend; in
particular, the need to enhance the capabilities of traditional inspection systems through the use
of smart detectors, and achieve a target level of detection performance against incidents, including
strategic attacks. We consider a game-theoretic formulation of the strategic network inspection
problem, and address the question: How many detectors are required and how to strategically posi-
tion them in the network to detect multiple adversarial attacks? Our formulation is also relevant
to a range of applications, as listed in Table 1.
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1.1. Our Contributions
In Section 2, we introduce a generic detection model, which captures the key features of modern
inspection systems with respect to sensing technology for event detection and flexibility of posi-
tioning. Mathematically, the model is represented by a monotone submodular detection function.
We use this detection model to define a game-theoretic model of strategic interaction between a
defender (inspection agency) and an attacker. The defender chooses where to position her detectors,
and the attacker chooses to target one or more network components. Each player is resource-
constrained. The defender’s objective is to maximize the number of detected attacks, whereas the
attacker’s objective is to maximize the number of undetected attacks. We adopt mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium as the solution concept of this game. We then formulate our inspection prob-
lem, denoted (P), as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. In this problem, the
defender seeks to minimize the number of detectors such that the expected detection rate of attacks
(i.e., detection performance) in any Nash equilibrium is above a pre-specified threshold.
Essentially, solving the problem (P) involves computing the equilibria of the defender-attacker
game. However, the sets of players’ actions grow combinatorially with the size of the network, which
makes the equilibrium computation challenging. For large-scale networks, the number of available
pure strategies for each player n can easily reach 1060. Well-known algorithms such as Lipton et al.
(2003)’s nO(lnn/
2) time algorithm for computing an −Nash equilibrium are practically inapplicable
for this setting. Instead, in this article, we develop a new solution approach based on the properties
of minimum set cover (MSC) and maximum set packing (MSP) problems. This approach enables
us to solve the problem (P) in a scalable manner and also provide performance guarantees.
Our equilibrium analysis in Section 3 consists of first studying useful structural properties that
are satisfied by all Nash equilibria of the defender-attacker game. We present these properties
for the most conservative case when the attacker has the ability to spread her attacks across the
network. In particular, we show that in any equilibrium, both players must randomize their actions
and use all available resources, and every network component must be monitored with positive
probability (Propositions 2-3). Importantly, while these are game-theoretic results, their proofs
also rely on the properties of the detection function, as well as MSCs and MSPs which respectively
capture the “coverage” and “spread” of the network.
These properties enable us to derive lower and upper bounds on the expected detection rate in
equilibrium in terms of both players’ available resources, and the optimal values of the MSC and
MSP problems (Theorem 1). A preliminary and specialized version of this result was presented
in Dahan et al. (2016). Moreover, using solutions of MSC and MSP problems, we construct a
strategy profile that not only is an −Nash equilibrium, but also provides each player a payoff that
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is −close to the payoff they would get in any Nash equilibrium (Theorem 2). Theorems 1 and 2 are
then used to derive an approximate solution to the problem (P), with guarantees on the detection
performance and the corresponding optimality gap (Proposition 4 in Section 4). It turns out that
our solution is optimal for the special case when the MSCs and MSPs are of same size.
Although our approach to solve problem (P) relies on the MSC and MSP problems which are
known to be NP-hard, we find that modern integer programming solvers can solve large instances
of these problems. In particular, in Section 5, we show that our solution approach is scalable to
large-sized benchmark distribution networks, and provides good performance guarantees.
Finally, in Section 6, we prove that the expected detection rate and the inspection strategies in
equilibrium do not depend on the attacker’s number of resources if they are smaller than the size of
MSPs (Theorem 3). This important and rather surprising structural property is a consequence of
the attacker’s ability to spread her attacks in the network, and the submodularity of the detection
model. From the defender’s perspective, this implies that she does not need to know precisely the
amount of attack resources. Another implication is that Nash equilibria can be obtained by solving
a linear program with a large number of variables but a small number of constraints. Therefore,
column generation can be used to iteratively improve our MSC/MSP-based solution to optimality.
The complete proofs of our results are provided in the electronic companion of this article.
1.2. Related Work
Our detection model is inspired by modern sensing technology used in detecting leaks and other
failure events in pipeline networks for distribution of natural gas (Phillips et al. 2013), and water
(Ostfeld and Salomons 2004, Sela Perelman et al. 2016). A classical problem in sensing of these
infrastructure networks is to optimally place sensors for maximizing the detection of leaks and
burst events. Robust formulations of the sensor placement problem have received interest in the
literature; for example, Krause et al. (2008) proposed an efficient approximation algorithm to
maximize the worst-case detection performance against a set of possible failure scenarios. More
recently, Orlin et al. (2016) and Tzoumas et al. (2017) designed approximation algorithms to find a
sensor placement that is robust against a subset of sensors’ failures. The main feature of this line of
work is fixed sensing, i.e., continuous operation of sensors placed at fixed locations in the network.
On the other hand, our setting is inspired by inspection operations based on smart detectors
that can be flexibly positioned in various parts of the network to detect and report incidents. In
such settings, it is well-known that randomized strategies can significantly improve the defender’s
performance against worst-case or adversarial failure events (Washburn and Wood 1995, Pita et al.
2008, Bertsimas et al. 2016).
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Our game-theoretic model is more general than the classical Hide-and-Seek game first introduced
by Von Neumann (1953), and further discussed in Ch. 3.2 of Karlin and Peres (2016). In this
zero-sum game, a robber hides in one of a set of “safe-houses” located at roads intersections,
and a police unit simultaneously chooses to travel along one road to find the robber. The roads
are restricted to be vertical avenues and horizontal streets. Our solution approach can be applied
to solve the generalized hide-and-seek game which involves multiple police units patrolling in a
complex street network to find multiple robbers. This is possible because our approach can account
for multiple player resources, and more realistic monitoring capabilities of the patrolling units. Our
game similarly generalizes the Infiltration Game with a Cable, as defined in Ch. 2.1 of Garnaev
(2000).
Finally, related to our setting is the work by Mavronicolas et al. (2008), who consider a security
game on an information network in which the nodes (servers) are vulnerable to multiple attacks
and the defender can install a firewall to protect a subnetwork. The defender’s goal is to maximize
the number of attack detections by randomizing the placement of her firewall. Simultaneously, the
attacker’s goal is to minimize the number of attacks detected by the firewall. While the authors
made the restricting assumption that each subnetwork contains exactly two servers, our detection
model can accommodate attack detections within subnetworks of heterogeneous sizes. In fact, our
solution approach can be used to derive a defense strategy based on the installation of multiple
firewalls to secure the network against multiple simultaneous attacks.
A comparison of these security games is given in Table 2.
2. Problem Description
In this section, we introduce a generic formulation of strategic network inspection problem based
on a game-theoretic model of defender-attacker interaction on the network. Our formulation is a
mathematical program with constraints defined in terms of the Nash equilibria of this game.
2.1. Defender and Attacker Models
Consider the setting where a defender (inspection agency) is concerned with positioning a set of
smart detectors in a given network to monitor a predefined set of components, denoted E . The set
of locations (or nodes) where a detector can be positioned is also predefined, and is denoted V. All
components in the set E are “critical” in that they are prone to targeted attacks by an attacker
(malicious entity). The attacker can simultaneously attack multiple components, and compromise
their functionality or quality of service. The defender seeks to inspect the network in order to
maximize the number of detected attacks. On the other hand, the attacker wishes to avoid being
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detected (i.e., maximize the number of undetected attacks), so as to reduce the overall functionality
of the network.
For our purpose, each detector can be viewed as an integrated system comprised of a sensor,
a detection software, a communication unit, and a human operator (utility employee) (Chong
and Kumar 2003). When a detector is positioned at node i ∈ V, the following steps are executed:
Firstly, the sensor collects relevant state measurements from node i. These measurements capture
the operational state of a subset of components Ci ∈ 2E . Secondly, the detection software processes
these measurements and generates a diagnostic signal indicating the number of attacks present
within the component set Ci. Thirdly, the communication unit transmits the diagnostic signal to
the defender. Finally, the human operator coordinates all these steps, and also ensures that the
detector system is positioned in the network as intended by the defender. The cost of data collection,
processing, and transmission is negligible in comparison to the cost of procuring the detector
(which includes the cost of purchasing the equipment and the cost of employing the operator).
For a detector positioned at node i ∈ V, we refer to the set Ci as a monitoring set, because under
the aforementioned assumptions, an attack to any component e∈ E can be detected if and only if
e ∈ Ci. The tuple G := (V,E ,{Ci, i ∈ V}) represents the detection model of the network. Without
loss of generality, we assume that each component in E can be monitored from at least one node
in V.
We assume that the defender has access to only a limited number of detectors for network
inspection. This limitation results from the economic and operational constraints of the defender.
For simplicity, we consider that all detectors are homogeneous in terms of their monitoring and
detection capabilities, and cost. Let b1 ∈ N be the number of available detectors that can be
simultaneously positioned on distinct nodes in V. We denote a detector positioning by a set S ∈ 2V
of nodes that receive detectors. The set of feasible detector positionings is then defined by A1 :=
{S ∈ 2V | |S| ≤ b1}. For a given detector positioning S ∈ A1, let CS := ∪i∈S Ci denote the set of
components that are monitored by at least one detector in S.
To count the number of components in any given subset of components of E that can be monitored
using an arbitrary detector positioning, we define a detection function F : 2V×2E −→N. Specifically,
for a detector positioning S ∈ 2V and a subset of components T ∈ 2E , the value of F(S,T ) is the
number of components of T that are monitored by at least one detector positioned in S, i.e.:
∀(S,T )∈ 2V × 2E , F(S,T ) := |CS ∩T |=
∑
e∈T
1{e∈CS}. (1)
The detection function has two natural properties:
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(i) For any subset of components T ∈ 2E , F(·, T ) is submodular and monotone:
∀T ∈ 2E , ∀(S,S′)∈ (2V)2,
{
F(S ∪S′, T ) + F(S ∩S′, T )≤F(S,T ) + F(S′, T ),
S ⊆ S′ =⇒ F(S,T )≤F(S′, T ).
That is, adding a detector to a smaller detector positioning increases the number of monitored
components in T by at least as many as when adding that detector to a larger detector positioning.
(ii) For any detector positioning S ∈ 2V , F(S, ·) is finitely additive (a direct consequence of (1)):
∀S ∈ 2V , ∀(T,T ′)∈ (2E)2 | T ∩T ′ = ∅, F(S,T ∪T ′) = F(S,T ) + F(S,T ′).
Similar to the defender, the attacker is also resource-constrained, in that she can attack a subset
of components T ∈ 2E of the network of size no larger than b2 ∈ N; we refer to such a subset as
an attack plan. This limitation arises from the attacker’s constraints in gaining an unauthorized
access to network components and compromising their functionality. However, the attacker has the
flexibility to spread her attacks throughout the network. The set of all attack plans is given by
A2 := {T ∈ 2E | |T | ≤ b2}.
2.2. Network Inspection Problem
We model the simplest form of strategic interaction in which both players make individual decisions
to maximize their objectives. Particularly, for a detector positioning S ∈ A1 and an attack plan
T ∈A2, the payoff of the defender (resp. attacker) is F(S,T ) (resp. |T |−F(S,T )). Both players have
the flexibility of changing their actions from one subset to another. For the defender, this means
that her detectors can be repositioned from one subset of nodes to another. Practically, changes in
detector positioning are executed by the utility personnel who use manual or automated means to
shift detectors.
In our model, the defender (resp. attacker) inspects (resp. attacks) the network using a detector
positioning S (resp. an attack plan T ) realized from a chosen probability distribution on the set A1
(resp. A2). Specifically, the defender and attacker respectively choose a mixed inspection strategy
σ1 ∈∆(A1) and a mixed attack strategy σ2 ∈∆(A2), where ∆(A1) := {σ1 ∈ [0,1]|A1| |
∑
S∈A1 σ
1
S =
1} and ∆(A2) := {σ2 ∈ [0,1]|A2| |
∑
T∈A2 σ
2
T = 1} denote the strategy sets. Here, σ1S (resp. σ2T )
represents the probability assigned to the detector positioning S (resp. attack plan T ) by the
defender’s strategy σ1 (resp. the attacker’s strategy σ2). The players’ strategies are independent
randomizations. Then, the expected players’ payoffs for a mixed strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈
∆(A1)×∆(A2) are given by:
U1(σ
1, σ2) =Eσ [F(S,T )] , (2)
U2(σ
1, σ2) =Eσ [|T |]−Eσ [F(S,T )] . (3)
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We consider that each player faces a strategic uncertainty about the other player’s action,
but the model parameters (G, b1, b2) as well as the payoff functions and strategy sets are com-
mon knowledge. Thus, we arrive at the strategic game of complete information: Γ(b1, b2) :=
〈{1,2}, (∆(A1),∆(A2)), (U1,U2)〉, where we refer to the defender as player 1 (or P1) and the
attacker as player 2 (or P2).
A strategy profile (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
)∈∆(A1)×∆(A2) is a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the
game Γ(b1, b2) if:
∀σ1 ∈∆(A1), U1(σ1∗, σ2∗)≥U1(σ1, σ2∗), (4)
∀σ2 ∈∆(A2), U2(σ1∗, σ2∗)≥U2(σ1∗, σ2). (5)
Furthermore, given ≥ 0, a strategy profile (σ1′, σ2′)∈∆(A1)×∆(A2) is an −NE if:
∀σ1 ∈∆(A1), U1(σ1′, σ2′)≥U1(σ1, σ2′)− , (6)
∀σ2 ∈∆(A2), U2(σ1′, σ2′)≥U2(σ1′, σ2)− . (7)
We denote the set of NE (resp. set of −NE) of the game Γ(b1, b2) as Σ(b1, b2) (resp. Σ(b1, b2)).
For ease of exposition, we denote F(i, e) := F({i},{e}), ∀(i, e) ∈ V × E . We will also use the
notations Ui(S,σ
2) = Ui(1{S}, σ2) and Ui(σ1, T ) = Ui(σ1,1{T}) for i ∈ {1,2}. The support of σ1 ∈
∆(A1) (resp. σ2 ∈ ∆(A2)) is defined as supp(σ1) = {S ∈ A1 | σ1S > 0} (resp. supp(σ2) = {T ∈
A2 | σ2T > 0}). The node basis of a strategy σ1 ∈∆(A1), denoted Vσ1 := {i ∈ V | Pσ1(i ∈ S)> 0},
is the set of nodes that are inspected with non-zero probability. Analogously, the component basis
of a strategy σ2 ∈∆(A2), denoted Eσ2 := {e ∈ E | Pσ2(e ∈ T ) > 0}, is the set of components that
are targeted with positive probability. Also, when there is no confusion, we will refer to Γ(b1, b2),
Σ(b1, b2), and Σ(b1, b2) simply as Γ, Σ, and Σ.
Despite its simplicity, the game Γ(b1, b2) captures some of the key features of network inspection
in strategic settings; see Table 1 for a comparison of various applications. Firstly, the underlying
detection model G is generic in that it represents the detection capability of the defender, without
making further modeling assumptions about how the monitoring sets Ci, i∈ V, depend on specific
aspects such as sensing technology employed by the detectors, the different means that the attacker
may use in targeting a component, and the network’s topological structure. Secondly, it considers
multiple resources on the part of both defender and attacker. This is a particularly desirable feature
for strategic inspection settings, in which the attacker can simultaneously attack multiple compo-
nents across the network, and the defender’s inspection involves positioning multiple detectors in
order to monitor a large number of critical components. In contrast, the previously studied security
games typically assume that one or both players are constrained to using only a single resource;
see Table 2.
Dahan, Sela, and Amin: Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks 9
More importantly, any strategy profile of the game Γ(b1, b2) can be associated with a metric of
detection performance against attacks. For a given strategy profile σ ∈∆(A1)×∆(A2), we define
this metric as the expected detection rate, r(σ), which is the expectation (under σ) of the ratio
between the number of attacks that are detected and the total number of attacks:
r(σ) :=Eσ
[
F(S,T )
|T |
]
. (8)
We are now in the position to introduce our network inspection problem, which we define as a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. In this problem, given the attacker’s resources
b2, the defender seeks to determine a minimum-resource inspection strategy (i.e., to minimize the
number of detectors b1 and strategically position them in the network), while ensuring that the
expected detection rate in any equilibrium of the game Γ(b1, b2) is no less than a pre-specified
threshold level α∈ [0,1]:
(P) : minimize
b1, σ†
b1
subject to r(σ∗)≥ α, ∀σ∗ ∈Σ(b1, b2) (9)
σ† ∈Σ(b1, b2) (10)
b1 ∈N.
Constraints (9) ensure that the expected detection rate in any equilibrium of the game induced
by the chosen number of detectors b1 and the given number of attack resources b2 is at least
α. Constraint (10) requires the computation of one NE of game Γ(b1, b2). The optimal value of
(P), denoted b†1, is the minimum number detectors for which the equilibrium constraints (9)-(10)
are satisfied. Thus, (b†1, σ
†) with σ† ∈Σ(b†1, b2) is an optimal solution of (P), where the inspection
strategy in σ† specifies a randomized positioning of b†1 detectors. The target detection rate α reflects
the performance requirement that the defender seeks to achieve in any equilibrium of the game,
besides seeking a minimum-resource inspection strategy.
3. Equilibrium Strategies
To solve the inspection problem (P) in a brute force manner, one would need to compute every NE
of the game Γ(b1, b2) for each b1 ∈N, and check – for each of them – whether or not the expected
detection rate is at least α. Clearly, this exhaustive approach is not computationally scalable. One
way to approach this problem is to note that Γ is strategically equivalent to the zero-sum game
Γ˜ := 〈{1,2}, (∆(A1),∆(A2)), (−U2,U2)〉. Therefore, the NE of Γ can be obtained by solving the
following two linear programming problems:
(LP1) max
σ1∈∆(A1)
min
T∈A2
−U2(σ1, T ) (LP2) max
σ2∈∆(A2)
min
S∈A1
U2(S,σ
2).
10 Dahan, Sela, and Amin: Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks
Thus, in principle, linear programming techniques can be used to compute NE of Γ. However, the
computation of (LP1) and (LP2) quickly becomes intractable as the size of the network increases.
In particular, due to the size of the players’ sets of actions (|A1|=
∑b1
k=0
(|V|
k
)
and |A2|=
∑b2
l=0
(|E|
l
)
),
the number of variables and constraints in both linear programs can be huge. For example, for a
network consisting of 200 nodes and components, and b1 = b2 = 10, computing the equilibria of
game Γ(b1, b2) entails solving linear programs containing 2.37 · 1016 variables and constraints. For
large bimatrix games, Lipton et al. (2003) provide an algorithm to compute an −NE in nO(lnn/2)
time. However, for realistic instances of the game Γ, the number of available pure strategies n for
each player can easily reach values for which their algorithm is practically inapplicable.
In this section, we develop new results to study the equilibrium characteristics of the game
Γ(b1, b2), given any parameters b1 and b2. Our equilibrium characterization utilizes properties of
two combinatorial optimization problems, formulated as minimum set cover and maximum set
packing problems. We also construct an approximate NE using solutions of these problems and
derive bounds on the detection performance, which subsequently enable us to solve the network
inspection problem (P).
3.1. Set Cover and Set Packing Problems
We say that a set of nodes S ∈ 2V is a set cover if and only if every component in E can be
monitored by at least one detector positioned in S, i.e., F(S, e) = 1, ∀e∈ E . A set of nodes S ∈ 2V is
a minimal set cover if S is a set cover that is minimum with respect to inclusion, i.e., if any node
of S is removed, the resulting set is not a set cover anymore. A set of nodes S ∈ 2V is a minimum
set cover (MSC) if and only if it is an optimal solution of the following problem:
(IMSC) : minimize
S∈2V
|S| subject to F(S, e) = 1, ∀e∈ E . (11)
Solving (IMSC) amounts to determining the minimum number of detectors and their positioning
to monitor all network components. We denote the set (resp. the size) of MSCs by S (resp. n∗).
Since we assumed that each component can be monitored from at least one node in the network
(Section 2.1), (IMSC) is feasible and n∗ exists.
We say that a set of components T ∈ 2E is a set packing if and only if a detector positioned at
any node i can monitor at most one component in T , i.e., F(i, T )≤ 1, ∀i∈ V. A set of components
T ∈ 2E is a maximum set packing (MSP) if and only if it optimally solves the following problem:
(IMSP) : maximize
T∈2E
|T | subject to F(i, T )≤ 1, ∀i∈ V. (12)
Solving (IMSP) amounts to finding the maximum number of “independent” components, i.e.,
a set of components of maximum size such that monitoring each component requires a unique
detector. We denote the set (resp. the size) of MSPs by M (resp. m∗).
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Although, (IMSC) and (IMSP) are known to be NP-hard problems, modern mixed-integer opti-
mization solvers can be used to optimally solve them for realistic problem instances; see Section 5.
Furthermore, their integer programming formulations have linear programming relaxations that
are dual of each other (see Ch. 13.1 of Vazirani (2001)). This implies that m∗ ≤ n∗.
MSCs and MSPs represent the network’s coverage and spread, respectively: n∗ represents the
minimum number of detectors required by P1 to completely monitor the network, and m∗ repre-
sents the maximum number of attack resources for which P2 can spread her attacks across the
network. In fact, solving Γ(b1, b2) is trivial when b1 ≥ n∗, because P1 can monitor all network com-
ponents by deterministically positioning the detectors on an MSC. A direct consequence is that
the optimal number of detectors in (P), b†1, is at most n∗.
Additionally, the equilibrium characterization of the game Γ(b1, b2) is practically relevant (and
interesting) when P2’s number of attack resources is less than the size of MSPs, i.e., b2 <m
∗. This
case captures the situations in which the network is “large enough” in that P2 can exhaust her
ability to spread attacks, thereby making it most challenging for P1 to detect the attacks using
her inspection strategy. Furthermore, when b2 ≥m∗, a larger number of attack resources improves
P1’s ability to detect some of the attacks. Thus, an inspection strategy that ensures the target
detection performance for the case b2 < m
∗ can also be applied when b2 ≥m∗. Henceforth, our
analysis of the game Γ(b1, b2) primarily focuses on the case when b1 <n
∗ and b2 <m∗ (see Fig. 1).
We discuss the other cases whenever relevant.
3.2. Equilibrium Properties
Our analysis of the game Γ(b1, b2) proceeds in three steps: Firstly, we derive bounds on the players’
equilibrium payoffs in the strategically equivalent zero-sum game Γ˜(b1, b2) (Proposition 1). Sec-
ondly, we show that every NE satisfies certain structural properties, which enables us to obtain
bounds on the players’ payoffs and the expected detection rate in equilibirium of the original game
Γ(b1, b2) (Propositions 2-3 and Theorem 1). Finally, we construct an approximate NE based on
exact or approximate solutions to the MSC and MSP problems (Theorem 2).
Recall that in any equilibrium, P1’s strategy is an optimal solution of (LP1), and P2’s strategy
is an optimal solution of (LP2). Moreover, the optimal values of these linear programs represent
the players’ equilibrium payoffs in the game Γ˜(b1, b2). In the first step of our analysis, we derive
bounds on the optimal values of (LP1) and (LP2), along with mixed strategies that achieve these
bounds. To carry out this step, we utilize the following construction of a mixed strategy profile:
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Lemma 1. Consider a set of nodes S ∈ 2V of size n≥ b1, and a set of components T ∈ 2E of size
m≥ b2. Then, there exists a strategy profile, denoted (σ1(S, b1), σ2(T, b2))∈∆(A1)×∆(A2), whose
node basis and component basis are S and T respectively, and such that:
∀i∈ S, Pσ1(S,b1)(i is inspected by P1) =
b1
n
, (13)
∀e∈ T, Pσ2(T,b2)(e is targeted by P2) =
b2
m
. (14)
For details on the construction of (σ1(S, b1), σ
2(T, b2)), we refer to Lemma EC.5. The main idea
behind the construction of the inspection strategy σ1(S, b1) is to “cycle” over size-b1 subsets of S,
such that every node of S is inspected with an identical probability given by (13); similarly for the
attack strategy σ2(T, b2).
Next, we use Lemma 1 to solve restricted versions of (LP1) and (LP2), where only specific subsets
of variables are considered. Formally, given a subset of nodes S′ ∈ 2V , and a subset of components
T ′ ∈ 2E , consider the following linear programs:
(LPS′) max{σ1∈∆(A1) | Vσ1⊆S′}
min
T∈A2
−U2(σ1, T ) (LPT ′) max{σ2∈∆(A2) | Eσ2⊆T ′}
min
S∈A1
U2(S,σ
2)
We note that adding the constraint Vσ1 ⊆ S′ is equivalent to setting σ1S = 0 for every detector
positioning S that contains a node outside of the set S′. It is easy to argue that the optimal values
of (LPS′) and (LPT ′) are lower bounds on P1 and P2’s equilibrium payoffs in the zero-sum game
Γ˜. Furthermore, when S′ and T ′ are the node basis and component basis of a NE, the optimal
values of (LPS′) and (LPT ′) are exactly equal to P1 and P2’s equilibrium payoffs in Γ˜.
We now discuss how to select a subset of nodes S′ and a subset of components T ′ such that the
optimal values of (LPS′) and (LPT ′) are close to the players’ equilibrium payoffs in the game Γ˜.
Recall that if P1 had at least n∗ detectors (i.e., b1 ≥ n∗), an equilibrium inspection strategy would
be to position n∗ detectors on an MSC. We claim that, even for the case when P1 has strictly less
than n∗ detectors, a set cover is a good candidate for node basis. Analogously, a good candidate for
component basis is a set packing. Indeed, if P2 targets components that are spread apart, then it
will be difficult for the resource-constrained P1 to detect many of these attacks. Thus, by targeting
a set packing, P2 can ensure that a single detector can detect at most one attack. In fact, when
S′ is a minimal set cover and T ′ is a set packing of size at least b2, we can use the construction of
the strategy profile (σ1(S′, b1), σ2(T ′, b2)) in Lemma 1 to analytically solve (LPS′) and (LPT ′):
Proposition 1. Given a minimal set cover S′ ∈ 2V , the optimal value of (LPS′) is b2
(
b1
|S′| − 1
)
,
and an optimal solution is given by σ1(S′, b1). Also, given a set packing T ′ ∈ 2E of size at least b2,
the optimal value of (LPT ′) is max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1|T ′|
)}
, and an optimal solution is given by σ2(T ′, b2).
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From this proposition, we know that for any minimal set cover S′ and any set packing T ′ of size
at least b2, lower bounds on P1 and P2’s equilibrium payoffs in the zero-sum game Γ˜ are given
by b2
(
b1
|S′| − 1
)
and max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1|T ′|
)}
, respectively. By decreasing the size of the minimal set
cover and increasing the size of the set packing, one can maximize the respective lower bounds.
Thus, the best lower bound on the optimal value of (LP1) (resp. (LP2)) that we obtain is b2
(
b1
n∗ − 1
)
(resp. max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1
m∗
)}
).
The second step consists of deriving structural properties satisfied by every NE. This enables us
to translate the bounds on the players’ equilibrium payoffs in game Γ˜ to bounds on the expected
equilibrium detection rate. An important property is that when b1 <n
∗ and b2 <m∗, any equilib-
rium strategy for each player necessarily randomizes over actions that use all available resources.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, P1 must choose an inspection strategy that randomizes over detec-
tor positionings of size exactly b1, and P2 must randomize her attacks over sets of b2 components.
∀(σ1∗, σ2∗)∈Σ, ∀S ∈ supp(σ1∗), |S|= b1, (15)
∀(σ1∗, σ2∗)∈Σ, ∀T ∈ supp(σ2∗), |T |= b2. (16)
Then, the NE of Γ can be obtained by solving the following two linear programs:
(LP1) max
σ1∈∆(A1)
min
T∈A2
U1(σ
1, T ) (LP2) min
σ2∈∆(A2)
max
S∈A1
U1(S,σ
2)
where A1 := {S ∈ 2V | |S|= b1} and A2 := {T ∈ 2E | |T |= b2}.
Although it is intuitive that both players should use all available resources, the value of this result
lies in the fact that both players must necessarily do so. Property (15) is proven by showing that
any additional detector can be utilized by P1 to strictly improve her payoff, which holds because
the network is “large” (captured by the inequality b1 < n
∗). Similarly, property (16) is proven by
showing that any additional attack resource can be used by P2 to strictly improve her payoff.
This argument combines the fact that P1 cannot monitor all network components with a single
detector positioning, and that P2 can spread her attacks (since b2 <m
∗). In addition, showing (16)
involves using the features of the detection function F, Proposition 1, and the properties of (IMSC)
and (IMSP). Proposition 2 also holds when b1 <n∗ and b2 =m∗. However, counterexamples can be
found when b1 ≥ n∗ or b2 >m∗; see Section EC.5.
From (15) and (16), we conclude that the NE of the game Γ can be obtained by solving smaller
linear programs. Indeed, the number of variables and constraints can be reduced from 1 +
∑b1
k=0
(|V|
k
)
and 1 +
∑b2
l=0
(|E|
l
)
for (LP1), to 1 +
(|V|
b1
)
and 1 +
(|E|
b2
)
for (LP1); similar reduction applies between
(LP2) and (LP2). Although (LP1) and (LP2) can be used to compute NE for small-sized networks,
this approach is still not scalable to large-sized networks.
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Hence, we continue our analysis by focusing on the node bases of inspection strategies in equi-
librium, which represent the sets of nodes that are inspected with positive probability by P1.
Proposition 3. In any NE (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
)∈Σ, the node basis Vσ1∗ is a set cover.
Furthermore, both players must necessarily randomize their actions in equilibrium.
The proof of this result is based on a best-response argument, and uses the fact that from any
inspection strategy that leaves one or more components completely unmonitored, we can construct
another strategy that strictly improves P1’s payoff. This argument is completed by repositioning
some detectors and evaluating the resulting change in P1’s payoff, which involves exploiting the
submodularity of the detection function F, the upper bound on P1’s equilibrium payoff in Γ˜
(Proposition 1), and the fact that the players must use all resources in equilibrium (Proposition 2).
Interestingly, this result may not hold when b2 ≥m∗: In that case, P2 may target components that
are “close” to each other, which can result in P1 leaving some components completely unmonitored
to focus on the ones for which targeted attacks are easier to detect; see Section EC.5 for an example.
We can now combine the aforementioned equilibrium properties to derive parametric bounds on
the players’ payoffs and the expected detection rate in equilibrium.
Theorem 1. For a given detection model G, and the players’ resources b1 < n∗ and b2 <m∗, the
game Γ(b1, b2) has the following properties:
(i) Equilibrium payoffs of both players are constant and bounded as follows:
∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ(b1, b2),

b1b2
n∗
≤U1(σ1∗ , σ2∗)≤min
{
b1b2
m∗
, b2
}
,
max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1
m∗
)}
≤U2(σ1∗ , σ2∗)≤ b2
(
1− b1
n∗
)
.
(ii) In any equilibrium, the expected detection rate is constant and bounded as follows:
∀σ∗ ∈Σ(b1, b2), b1
n∗
≤ r(σ∗)≤min
{
b1
m∗
,1
}
.
Firstly, we note that the lower and upper bounds on P1’s equilibrium payoff are nondecreasing
with respect to b1 and b2. The intuition is that the more detectors P1 has, the more attacks she
will be able to detect. Also, the more attack resources P2 has, the more components she will target
(due to Proposition 2); this results in more detections, since each component is monitored with
positive probability in equilibrium (Proposition 3). Secondly, these bounds are also nonincreasing
with respect to n∗ and m∗. Indeed, as the network size becomes larger, both n∗ and m∗ increase
because each monitoring set covers a smaller fraction of the network. Thus, it is more difficult for
P1 to detect attacks (with the same number of detectors) in larger-sized networks, reducing her
detection performance. Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding the bounds on P2’s equilibrium
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payoff. Thirdly, the bounds on the expected detection rate in equilibrium are nondecreasing with
P1’s resources (because she can detect more attacks), and are nonincreasing with respect to n∗ and
m∗ (because P2 can spread her attacks further apart). Importantly, these bounds do not depend
on the attack resources b2. This property will be further investigated in Section 6.
The final step of our analysis consists of constructing an approximate NE. In particular, we
combine Propositions 1 and 2 to show that the construction introduced in Lemma 1, based on an
MSC and an MSP, is an approximate NE of Γ.
Theorem 2. Consider a detection model G, and the players’ resources b1 <n∗ and b2 <m∗. Then,
for any MSC Smin ∈ S and any MSP Tmax ∈M, the strategy profile (σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))
satisfies the following properties:
(i.a) (σ1(Smin, b1), σ
2(Tmax, b2))∈Σ(b1, b2),
(i.b) |Ui(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))−Ui(σ1∗ , σ2∗)| ≤ , ∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ(b1, b2), ∀i∈ {1,2},
where = b1b2
(
1
max{b1,m∗} −
1
n∗
)
.
Furthermore, given an MSC Smin ∈ S, the expected detection rate by positioning b1 detectors
according to σ1(Smin, b1) provides the following detection guarantee:
(ii) min
σ2∈∆(A2)
r(σ1(Smin, b1), σ
2) =
b1
n∗
≥ max{b1,m
∗}
n∗
r(σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
), ∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ(b1, b2).
Theorem 2 (i.a) implies that by computing an MSC and an MSP, we can construct an −NE
where  depends on the players’ resources and on the sizes of MSCs and MSPs. Furthermore, from
(i.b), we conclude that this −NE has the additional property that it provides both players payoffs
that are −close to their respective equilibrium payoffs. It is important to note that this is not a
generic property of −NE, but a consequence of Propositions 1 and 2. Thanks to this result, our
approximate NE is obtained by direct construction (i.e., by solving the MSC and MSP problems),
and not by iterative computation.
Furthermore, from Theorem 2 (ii), we know that by using σ1(Smin, b1) as inspection strategy,
P1 is guaranteed an expected detection rate of at least b1
n∗ , regardless of the attack strategy chosen
by P2. In fact, the relative difference between the expected detection rate in equilibrium and when
P1 chooses σ1(Smin, b1) is upper bounded by 1− max{b1,m
∗}
n∗ ; we refer to this bound as the relative
loss of performance.
We note that when n∗ and m∗ become closer to each other (or equivalently, as the duality gap
between (IMSC) and (IMSP) decreases), the gap between the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 1
also becomes narrower, and (σ1(Smin, b1), σ
2(Tmax, b2)) in Theorem 2 becomes closer to a NE. In
fact, when n∗ =m∗, the results in Theorems 1 and 2 can be tightened as follows: If n∗ =m∗ (in
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addition to b1 <n
∗ and b2 <m∗), (σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2)) is a NE, and the players’ payoffs and
the expected detection rate in equilibrium are given by:
∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ(b1, b2),

U1(σ
1∗, σ2∗) =
b1b2
n∗
,
U2(σ
1∗, σ2∗) = b2
(
1− b1
n∗
)
,
(17)
∀σ∗ ∈Σ(b1, b2), r(σ∗) = b1
n∗
. (18)
This result generalizes the equilibrium characterization of prior results on security games. Indeed,
our MSC/MSP-based characterization of NE applies to any detection model for which the equality
n∗ = m∗ holds. In Table 2, we list some of the classical models that fall into this category, and
compare their features with those of our game. The table highlights the flexibility of our detection
model G = (V,E ,{Ci, i ∈ V}), and compares the combinatorial objects underlying our equilibrium
characterization with their settings. Importantly, our results generalize the players’ equilibrium
strategies to the case where they have multiple resources.
4. Solving the Network Inspection Problem
In the previous section, we derived properties satisfied by all equilibrium inspection and attack
strategies in the game Γ(b1, b2), with b1 < n
∗ and b2 <m∗. These properties enabled us to prove
Theorem 1 which provides bounds on the expected detection rate in any NE, and also Theorem 2
which gives an −NE of Γ using optimal solutions of (IMSC) and (IMSP). Next, we use these results
to derive a solution approach to approximately solve the network inspection problem (P).
To motivate our approach, let us first consider the special case of n∗ =m∗. From (18), we can
easily conclude that the minimum number of detectors that are needed for the expected detection
rate to be at least α in equilibrium is b†1 = dαn∗e. Besides, for an MSC Smin and an MSP Tmax, we
know from Theorem 2 that (σ1(Smin, b†1), σ
2(Tmax, b2)) is a NE of the game Γ(b
†
1, b2). Therefore,
when b2 <m
∗ and n∗ = m∗, our approach straightforwardly provides an optimal solution of the
network inspection problem (P), given by dαn∗e, (σ1(Smin, dαn∗e), σ2(Tmax, b2)).
Now consider the problem (P) in the general case m∗ ≤ n∗. Can our approach be extended to
obtain an approximate solution of (P) in this general case? To address this question, we consider
−NE as an admissible equilibrium concept for the game Γ, and focus on a relaxed version of (P)
in which the constraint (10) is replaced by σ† ∈Σ(b1, b2), with ≥ 0. Our next result shows that
this relaxed problem, denoted (P), is approximately solvable using our approach.
Proposition 4. Consider a detection model G, a target detection performance α∈ [0,1], and P2’s
attack resources b2 <m
∗. Then, for any MSC Smin ∈ S and any MSP Tmax ∈M, b′1 := dαn∗e and
(σ1(Smin, b′1), σ
2(Tmax, b2)) is an approximate solution of (P), where  = b′1b2
(
1
max{b′1,m∗}
− 1
n∗
)
,
with an optimality gap given by dαn∗e− dαm∗e.
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Indeed, with dαn∗e detectors, the lower bound on the expected detection rate in equilibrium of
the induced game Γ(dαn∗e, b2), given in Theorem 1, ensures that the equilibrium constraints (9) are
satisfied. Furthermore, the upper bound on the expected equilibrium detection rate in Theorem 1
implies that P1 needs at least dαm∗e detectors to satisfy (9). Consequently, the optimal value of
(P) satisfies dαm∗e ≤ b†1 ≤ dαn∗e, which gives the optimality gap in Proposition 4. Moreover, from
Theorem 2, we know that our strategy profile constructed over an MSC and an MSP (according
to Lemma 1) is an −NE. Thus, we obtain an approximate solution of the relaxed problem (P),
using solutions of the MSC and MSP problems. Clearly, this solution is optimal when n∗ =m∗.
Let us illustrate our solution approach on a small-sized pipeline network of 23 nodes and 34
pipelines (Giustolisi et al. 2008), as shown in Fig. 2a. Consider a situation where this network
is targeted by an adversary who can induce multiple break events. Specifically, in problem (P),
consider that the defender faces an adversary with b2 = 2 number of attack resources and wants
to ensure an expected detection rate of α = 0.75. First, we determine the monitoring sets Ci for
detecting break events from each location i∈ V, and solve (IMSC) to compute an MSC Smin of size
n∗ = 4. From Theorem 1, we know that with b′1 = dαn∗e= 3 detectors, the expected detection rate
in any equilibrium is at least α. Secondly, we solve (IMSP) to compute an MSP Tmax, which is of size
m∗ = 3. Then, from Proposition 4, we deduce that the optimality gap associated with b′1 is given by
dαn∗e−dαm∗e= d3e−d2.25e= 0, so the optimal number of detectors is b†1 = 3. Thirdly, given b′1 = 3
and b2 = 2, we can use S
min and Tmax to construct the strategy profile (σ1(Smin, b′1), σ
2(Tmax, b2))
according to Lemma 1. From Theorem 2, this strategy profile is an −NE, and provides each
player a payoff that is −close to their equilibrium payoff, with  = b′1b2
(
1
max{b′1,m∗}
− 1
n∗
)
= 1
2
.
Finally, Theorem 2 also gives an upper bound on the loss in detection performance by choosing
σ1(Smin, b′1) as inspection strategy, relative to an equilibrium strategy. This upper bound is given
by 1− max{b′1,m∗}
n∗ = 25 %. In fact, for this small network, we can optimally solve (P) using (LP1)
and (LP2) to validate the optimality guarantees provided by our solution approach; see Fig. 2b.
We now summarize the main advantages of our solution approach. Firstly, it reduces to a sig-
nificant extent the size of the optimization problems that are involved in computing a solution.
Indeed, recall that the number of variables and constraints of (LP1) is equal to 1 +
∑b1
k=0
(|V|
k
)
and
1 +
∑b2
l=0
(|E|
l
)
respectively. On the other hand, the number of variables and constraints of (IMSC)
is only |V| and |E|, respectively; analogous comparisons can be made between (LP2) and (IMSP).
Secondly, solving a single instance of (IMSC) and (IMSP) enables us to use our approach and
derive a solution to problem (P) for any attack resources b2, and any target detection rate α. In
contrast, recall from Section 3 that computing an optimal solution of (P) using (LP1) and (LP2)
requires solving them for each value of b1. Furthermore, P2’s amount of resources b2 explicitly
enters in the formulation of (LP1) and (LP2) as a parameter. On the contrary, in our approach,
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P1 does not need to know the exact amount of attack resources b2 to determine the number of
detectors she needs and how to position them. Indeed, from Theorem 2, we know that with dαn∗e
detectors that are positioned according to σ1(Smin, dαn∗e), P1 is guaranteed to meet the target
detection rate α. Furthermore, as long as b2 <m
∗, the performance guarantees, and the optimality
gap associated with our solution can directly be computed from n∗ and m∗. In fact, we argue in
Section 6 that if b2 <m
∗, then the optimal number of detectors in (P) does not depend on b2, and
their positioning in equilibrium can be determined by considering b2 = 1.
Finally, we note that while the abovementioned results require computing an MSC and an MSP
(both NP-hard problems), modern mixed-integer optimization solvers can be used to optimally
solve them (see Section 5). However, for extremely large-sized problems, these solvers may not be
able to solve (IMSC) and (IMSP) to optimality. Still, we can extend our results based only on the
computation of a set cover and a set packing. Indeed, given a set cover S′ and a set packing T ′
obtained from a heuristic or greedy algorithm (Chvatal 1979, Hifi 1997), we can extend Prop. 4,
and conclude that dα|S′|e and (σ1(S′, dα|S′|e), σ2(T ′, b2)) is an approximate solution of (P˜), where
˜ = dα|S′|eb2
(
1
max{dα|S′|e,|T ′|} − 1|S′|
)
. The associated optimality gap is given by dα|S′|e − dα|T ′|e,
which decreases as the size of the set cover decreases and the size of the set packing increases.
5. Computational Results
In this section, we demonstrate the scalability and performance guarantees of our approach for
large-scale networks. For the sake of illustration, we consider a batch of benchmark distribution
networks from the water sector that are used by researchers to test network monitoring algorithms.
Table 3 lists the characteristics of the 13 networks considered in our study. The data for these
networks can be found in Perelman et al. (2008), University of Exeter (2014), Jolly et al. (2014).
All network simulations were implemented in Matlab, and all optimization problems were solved
using the Gurobi solver on a computer with a 2.81 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM.
We consider an instantiation of problem (P) in which the defender is tasked with detecting
multiple pipeline leaks caused by the attacker. To detect these attacks, we consider that the defender
has access to the relevant detection technology (Chong and Kumar 2003, von Fischer et al. 2017).
We then apply our solution approach for each network: We consider that the set of monitoring
locations V is given by the set of network nodes, and that the set E that the defender is interested
in monitoring is the set of pipes. Then, for each possible monitoring location i∈ V, we compute the
monitoring set Ci (defined in Section 2.1). Specifically, in our study, monitoring sets are computed
through simulations using a threshold-based detection model, as proposed in Ostfeld and Salomons
(2004), Sela Perelman et al. (2016). Then, we solve (IMSC) to compute the number of detectors
that are sufficient to achieve the target detection performance, and to construct an inspection
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strategy. Next, we solve (IMSP), which enables us to evaluate the performance of our solution, i.e.,
we compute the optimality gap given in Prop. 4 and the relative loss of performance derived from
Theorem 2. The computational results are summarized in Table 3.
We note that the sizes of MSCs and MSPs are equal for 6 out of the 13 networks. Thus, for
these 6 networks, our approach gives an optimal solution of (P). For the remaining 7 networks, we
note that the relative difference between n∗ and m∗ is still small, which implies that our estimate
of the optimal value of (P), b′1 = dαn∗e, is close to the optimal value b†1. Additionally, we can see
from Table 3 that the loss in detection performance by choosing σ1(Smin, b′1) in comparison to
the performance in equilibrium is small (2.7% on average over all networks). Indeed, even for the
networks for which n∗ 6=m∗, we obtain a loss in detection performance between 1.7% and 6.7%.
Finally, the time to solve the integer programming formulations of (IMSC) and (IMSP) is fairly
small. For networks with less than 1500 nodes and components, Gurobi computes an optimal
solution in less than half a second, which directly enables us to construct an (approximate) NE.
Recall that even for such medium-sized networks, (LP1) and (LP2) cannot be used to compute
equilibrium strategies. Besides, for larger networks, we can obtain n∗ and m∗ in about a minute.
Thus, our approach is scalable to large-scale networks, thanks to modern optimization solvers.
6. Refinement Procedure for Exactly Solving (P)
The computational results in Section 5 indicate that our solution approach is scalable to realistic
instances of (P), and provides reasonable performance guarantees. However, the defender might
desire a solution to (P) which is closer to optimality, i.e., an equilibrium inspection strategy utilizing
the optimal number of detectors. In this section, we develop a procedure that iteratively refines the
MSC/MSP-based solution proposed in Proposition 4 to provide a stronger performance guarantee,
until it reaches optimality of (P). This procedure relies on an important and rather surprising
property of the expected detection rate in equilibrium of the game Γ:
Theorem 3. Given a detection model G, and P1’s resources b1 ∈N, the expected detection rate in
equilibrium is identical in any game Γ(b1, b2), with b2 <m
∗; we denote it as r∗b1.
∀b1 ∈N, ∃ r∗b1 ∈ [0,1] | ∀b2 <m∗, ∀σ∗ ∈Σ(b1, b2), r(σ∗) = r∗b1 .
This property is the result of both game-theoretic and combinatorial aspects of our problem. The
proof starts by upper bounding the attack probabilities of each component in equilibrium. This
is done by accounting for P2’s ability to spread her attacks in the network – which is evaluated
by Proposition 1 and MSPs – and by exploiting the submodularity of the detection function F
with respect to the first variable. These bounds enable us to further characterize P2’s equilibrium
strategies for any game Γ(b1, b2), with b2 < m
∗. Specifically, consider an attack strategy σ2
∗
in
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equilibrium of Γ(b1,1), and let ρσ2∗ (e) denote the resulting probability with which each component
e∈ E is targeted. Then, for any b2 <m∗, by applying Farkas’ lemma, we can show the existence of
an attack strategy in equilibrium of Γ(b1, b2) such that the probability with which e∈ E is targeted
is given by b2ρσ2∗ (e). From the additivity of the detection function F with respect to the second
variable, we can deduce that P1’s equilibrium payoff is linear with respect to b2. Finally, from
Proposition 2, we conclude that the expected detection rate in equilibrium is independent of b2.
This whole argument works because the network is large in comparison to P2’s resources, i.e.,
b2 <m
∗. While Theorem 3 also holds when b2 =m∗, counterexamples can be found when b2 >m∗;
see Section EC.5.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 is that both players’ equilibrium
payoffs can be expressed as follows:
∀b1 <n∗, ∀b2 <m∗, ∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ(b1, b2),
{
U1(σ
1∗, σ2∗) = b2 r∗b1
U2(σ
1∗, σ2∗) = b2 (1− r∗b1).
(19)
For the special case when n∗ =m∗, r∗b1 =
b1
n∗ (from (18)) and we find again (17) from (19). Another
implication of Theorem 3 is that the optimal value of (P) does not depend on b2 (since the
equilibrium constraints (9) can be replaced by r∗b1 ≥ α), and that equilibrium inspection strategies
in the game Γ(b1,1) are also equilibrium inspection strategies in the game Γ(b1, b2) for every value
of b2 <m
∗ (Proposition EC.1). Therefore, we can solve the problem (P) by considering that b2 = 1!
This conclusion provides a significant advantage from a computational viewpoint. Recall from
Prop. 2 that the inspection strategies in equilibrium of the game Γ(b1, b2) are the optimal solutions
of the linear program (LP1), which has
(|V|
b1
)
+ 1 variables and
(|E|
b2
)
+ 1 constraints. Now, given
b1 <n
∗, and by considering that b2 = 1, the optimal value of (LP1) is the expected detection rate
in equilibrium r∗b1 (see (19)), and its optimal solutions are inspection strategies in equilibrium of
any game Γ(b1, b2) with b2 <m
∗. Thus, (LP1) can now be reformulated with
(|V|
b1
)
+ 1 variables and
only |E|+ 1 constraints, and one can use column generation to solve it (Dantzig and Wolfe 1960).
Each iteration of the column generation algorithm involves solving a master problem and a
subproblem; see Section EC.4 for further details. Essentially, the master problem is a restricted
version of (LP1), where only a subset of variables are considered. Once the master problem is
solved, the optimal dual variables are used to construct the subproblem, which involves finding
the variable in the unrestricted (LP1) with highest reduced cost. In our case, the subproblem
can be formulated as a maximum weighted covering set problem, where the component weights
are the optimal dual variables obtained from the master problem. If the highest reduced cost is
nonpositive, then the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the corresponding detector positioning is
added to the list of variables considered in the master problem. This process is repeated until the
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highest reduced cost computed from the subproblem is nonpositive, which certifies that the current
optimal solution of the master problem is also optimal for the unrestricted (LP1).
Thus, we finally arrive at the following computational procedure to exactly solve problem (P):
Refinement Procedure
– Build the detection model G = (V,E ,{Ci, i∈ V})
– Compute an MSC Smin ∈ S and its size n∗ by solving (IMSC)
– Choose dαn∗e as initial value of b1
– For each decreasing value of b1, solve (LP1) by considering b2 = 1 using the following steps:
- Construct the MSC-based inspection strategy σ1(Smin, b1)
- Run the column generation algorithm, using σ1(Smin, b1) as a warm-start
- At termination, obtain an equilibrium inspection strategy which uses b1 detectors, and has
expected detection rate r∗b1
– Stop the overall procedure if r∗b1 <α
After each iteration of the column generation algorithm on (LP1), let σ
1′ and r′ respec-
tively denote the current inspection strategy and value of the objective function; note that r′ =
mine∈E U1(σ1
′
, e). Then, one can derive performance guarantees for σ1
′
by solving (IMSP), similarly
to Theorem 2. Indeed, given m∗, an upper bound on the relative loss in detection performance is
given by `′ = 1− max{b1,m∗}
b1
r′. Furthermore, for any b2 <m∗, one can use Lemma 1 to construct
an MSP-based attack strategy. The resulting strategy profile (σ1
′
, σ2(Tmax, b2)) is an 
′−NE of
Γ(b1, b2) and provides both players payoffs that are 
′−close to their respective equilibrium payoffs,
where ′ = b1b2( 1max{b1,m∗} −
r′
b1
). Note that when the MSC-based inspection strategy σ1(Smin, b1)
is used as an initial feasible solution for the column generation algorithm, the first iteration of
the master problem will give r′ = b1
n∗ , for which we find again the expressions of  and the loss in
detection performance from Theorem 2. Then, as the number of iterations of the column generation
algorithm increases, r′ increases, which causes ′ and `′ to decrease: thus, the inspection strategy
improves with each iteration. When (LP1) is solved to optimality for a given b1, the optimal dual
variables of (LP1) represent the probabilities with which the network components are targeted by
P2 in an equilibrium of the game Γ(b1,1). In Section EC.4, we provide a discussion on how to use
these probabilities to construct an attack strategy in equilibrium of Γ(b1, b2) for b2 ≤m∗.
A downside of this refinement procedure is that it throws away the simplicity of our initial
inspection strategy σ1(Smin, b1). In practice, the defender may prefer inspection strategies with
smaller support for ease of implementation. While our MSC-based inspection strategy σ1(Smin, b1)
uniformly randomizes over n∗ detector positionings, the column generation algorithm may output
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an equilibrium strategy with a support that is much larger than n∗. Thus, scheduling an inspection
operation according to this new strategy may require a larger level of effort. In contrast, our MSC-
based inspection strategy is more amenable for periodic scheduling of inspections. One possibility
is to run few iterations of the column generation algorithm, and stop when the inspection strategy
achieves a desirable tradeoff between detection guarantee and support size.
7. Concluding Remarks
We studied a stylized formulation of strategic network inspection in an adversarial environment. In
this problem, the defender seeks an inspection strategy that randomizes over minimum-size detector
positionings, while ensuring that the expected detection performance against attack plans is above a
certain threshold. We formulate the problem as a mathematical program with constraints involving
the mixed strategy NE of a defender-attacker game. Previously known algorithms for equilibrium
computation of two-player games cannot be applied to solve this large-scale game. Therefore, we
developed a novel approach for analyzing equilibrium properties of this game, which enables us to
solve the inspection problem for large-scale networks along with performance guarantees.
Our approach involves: (i) deriving useful qualitative properties satisfied by all NE; (ii) construct-
ing an −NE based on solutions of MSC and MSP problems; and (iii) computing an approximate
solution of the inspection problem that estimates the required number of detectors (with optimality
gap), and provides an inspection strategy with guarantee on the expected detection performance.
Furthermore, we showed a rather surprising property that, in equilibrium, the expected detection
rate and defender strategies can be analyzed by considering a unit attack resource. This property
leads to a column generation-based procedure for further improving the guarantees of our solu-
tion. Our proofs are based on both game-theoretic and combinatorial ideas; they crucially rely on
linear programming duality in zero-sum games, properties of MSC and MSP (including the weak
duality between them), and submodularity of the detection model. Our approach can be applied
for equilibrium characterization of various security games studied in the literature; importantly, it
can be used to solve more generalized models that consider multiple defense and attack resources.
A future research question is to solve the inspection problem under a more refined detection
model that accounts for imperfect detection of attacks (and other types of compromises). Typically,
the diagnostic ability of sensing technology is represented by a probabilistic detection rate for any
given false alarm rate. In fact, the guarantees provided by our approach can be easily extended (via
simple scaling) to the case when the detection probability is a priori known and homogeneous across
all detectors. The general case of heterogeneous detection rates can be addressed by extending
our detection model; in particular, by adding a weight to each inspected node to represent the
probability of detecting an attack within the node’s monitoring set.
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Finally, the question of how our solution approach can be extended to account for the hetero-
geneity of network components in terms of their criticality to the overall network functionality
is also an interesting one. In principle, this case can be addressed by adding weights to the pay-
off functions of our defender-attacker game. However, in many practical situations, the defender
can only qualitatively distinguish the criticality of various components (high versus low). In such
cases, our approach for strategic network inspection can be applied to each group of components
with homogeneous criticality levels, and the inspection strategies for individual groups can be then
integrated based on the defender’s operational constraints.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1 List of applications of our network inspection problem.
Inspection setting Network Type of detector Type of attacks
Urban patrolling city streets police unit robbery
Network security information network firewall cyberattack on server
Sensing of gas and water networks gas and water pipelines leak/pressure sensor pipe disruption
Interdiction of illegal goods transportation network police officer drug trafficking
Infiltration game water channel electric cable malicious infiltration
Table 2 Model comparisons.
Detection model Resources Combinatorial objects used
(monitoring locations, components, monitoring sets) def./att. for equilibrium characterization
Our model V E Ci, i∈ V b1/b2 MSC MSP
Karlin and
Peres (2016)
street roads safe-houses
safe-houses
located on road i
b1 = 1
b2 = 1
minimum
line cover
maximum
matching
Garnaev
et al. (1997)
cable location channel sections
sections covered
from the cable’s
location i
b1 = 1
b2 = 1
minimum
interval
cover
maximum
independent
infiltration set
Mavronicolas
et al. (2008)
network edge network nodes
end nodes of
edge i
b1 = 1
b2 ≥ 1
minimum
edge cover
maximum
independent set
Network path
interdiction
network edge network paths
paths containing
edge i
b1 = 1
b2 = 1
minimum
cardinality
cut set
maximum
edge-disjoint
paths
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Table 3 Network data and computational results, α= 0.75.
Network
Total length No. of No. of Running time [s]
m∗ n∗ dαn∗e Optimality Relative loss
[km] pipes nodes (IMSP) (IMSC) gap of performance
bwsn1 37.56 168 126 0.05 0.11 7 7 6 0 % 0 %
ky3 91.29 366 269 0.01 0.03 15 15 12 0 % 0 %
ky5 96.58 496 420 0.02 0.05 18 19 15 1 (7.14 %) 5.3 %
ky7 137.05 603 481 0.09 0.08 28 28 21 0 % 0 %
ky6 123.20 644 543 0.08 0.06 24 24 18 0 % 0 %
ky1 166.60 907 791 0.03 0.08 31 31 24 0 % 0 %
ky13 153.30 940 778 0.06 0.08 28 30 23 2 (9.52 %) 6.7 %
ky2 152.25 1124 811 0.39 0.41 18 19 15 1 (7.14 %) 5.3 %
ky4 260.24 1156 959 0.03 0.05 62 64 48 1 (2.13 %) 3.1 %
ky8 247.34 1614 1325 0.14 0.22 45 45 34 0 % 0 %
dover 779.86 16000 14965 4.34 8.36 119 121 91 1 (1.11 %) 1.7 %
bswn2 1,844.04 14822 12523 0.77 4.06 352 361 271 7 (2.65 %) 2.5 %
mnsr 476.67 25484 24681 58.89 68.67 50 52 39 1 (2.63 %) 3.8 %
b10 n∗
b2
m∗
Complete monitoring
(trivial game)
Redundant attacks
(easy detections)
Case of interest
(large network)
Figure 1 Equilibrium regimes with respect to the players’ resources b1 and b2.
pipeline break
(a) Network layout. The colored region indicates the loca-
tions from where a particular break event can be detected.
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σ
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α
(b) Equilibrium detection rate with respect to the
number of detectors b1.
Figure 2 Solving (P) for the Apulian benchmark network facing adversarial pipeline break events.
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Proofs of Statements
EC.1. Preliminary Results
First, we define the following quantities: For a strategy σ1 ∈∆(A1) of P1, the inspection probability
of node i∈ V, denoted ρσ1(i), is the probability with which i is inspected, i.e.:
∀σ1 ∈∆(A1), ∀i∈ V, ρσ1(i) :=Eσ1
[
1{i∈S}
]
=
∑
{S∈A1 | i∈S}
σ1S. (EC.1)
Given a strategy σ2 ∈∆(A2), the attack probability of component e ∈ E , denoted ρσ2(e), is the
probability with which e is targeted by σ2, i.e.:
∀σ2 ∈∆(A2), ∀e∈ E , ρσ2(e) :=Eσ2
[
1{e∈T}
]
=
∑
{T∈A2 |e∈T}
σ2T . (EC.2)
Lemma EC.1. The detection function defined in (1) satisfies the following properties:
(i) For any subset of components T ∈ 2E , F(·, T ) is submodular and monotone:
∀T ∈ 2E , ∀(S,S′)∈ (2V)2, F(S ∪S′, T ) + F(S ∩S′, T )≤F(S,T ) + F(S′, T ), (EC.3)
S ⊆ S′ =⇒ F(S,T )≤F(S′, T ). (EC.4)
(ii) For any detector positioning S ∈ 2V , F(S, ·) is finitely additive:
∀S ∈ 2V , ∀(T,T ′)∈ (2E)2 | T ∩T ′ = ∅, F(S,T ∪T ′) = F(S,T ) + F(S,T ′). (EC.5)
Proof of Lemma EC.1.
(i) Consider a subset of components T ∈ 2E , and a pair of detector positionings (S,S′) ∈ (2V)2.
Then, CS∪S′ = CS ∪CS′ and CS∩S′ ⊆CS ∩CS′ , and we obtain:
F(S ∪S′, T ) + F(S ∩S′, T ) (1)= |CS∪S′ ∩T |+ |CS∩S′ ∩T |= |(CS ∩T )∪ (CS′ ∩T )|+ |CS∩S′ ∩T |
= |CS ∩T |+ |CS′ ∩T | − |CS ∩CS′ ∩T |+ |CS∩S′ ∩T | ≤ |CS ∩T |+ |CS′ ∩T | (1)= F(S,T ) + F(S′, T ).
Furthermore, if S ⊆ S′, then: F(S,T ) (1)= |CS ∩T | ≤ |CS′ ∩T | (1)= F(S′, T ).
(ii) Consider a detector positioning S ∈ 2V . Then: ∀(T,T ′)∈ (2E)2 | T ∩T ′ = ∅, F(S,T ∪T ′) (1)=
|CS ∩ (T ∪T ′)|= |CS ∩T |+ |CS ∩T ′| − |CS ∩T ∩T ′| (1)= F(S,T ) + F(S,T ′). 
Corollary EC.1. The detection function defined in (1) satisfies the following properties:
∀(S,T )∈ 2V × 2E , F(S,T )≤
∑
i∈S
F(i, T ), (EC.6)
∀(S,T )∈ 2V × 2E , F(S,T ) =
∑
e∈T
F(S, e). (EC.7)
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Proof of Corollary EC.1.
(i) Consider T ∈ 2E . Since F(·, T ) is a submodular and nonnegative function, then F(·, T ) is
subadditive, i.e., ∀(S,S′)∈ (2V)2, F(S ∪S′, T )≤F(S,T ) + F(S′, T ).
Therefore, by induction, we obtain: ∀S ∈ 2V , F(S,T ) = F(∪i∈S{i}, T )≤
∑
i∈S F(i, T ).
(ii) Consider S ∈ 2V . Since F(S, ·) is additive (Lemma EC.1), we obtain by induction that ∀T ∈
2E , F(S,T ) = F(S,∪e∈T{e}) (EC.5)=
∑
e∈T F(S, e). 
Lemma EC.2. Given an inspection strategy σ1 ∈ ∆(A1), let {i1, . . . , in} ∈ 2V denote a set that
contains its node basis Vσ1 and such that ρσ1(i1) ≤ · · · ≤ ρσ1(in). Then, we have the following
inequality:
∀b∈ J1, nK, b∑
k=1
ρσ1(ik)≤
b
n
Eσ1 [|S|]. (EC.8)
Similarly, given an attack strategy σ2 ∈∆(A2), let {e1, . . . , em} ∈ 2E denote a set that contains its
component basis Eσ2, and such that ρσ2(e1)≥ · · · ≥ ρσ2(em). Then, we have the following inequality:
∀b∈ J1,mK, b∑
l=1
ρσ2(el)≥
b
m
Eσ2 [|T |]. (EC.9)
Proof of Lemma EC.2. Consider an inspection strategy σ1 ∈ ∆(A1), and a set of nodes
{i1, . . . , in} ∈ 2V such that Vσ1 ⊆ {i1, . . . , in} and ρσ1(i1) ≤ · · · ≤ ρσ1(in). We show the result by
contradiction: let us assume that ∃ b∈ J1, nK | ∑bk=1 ρσ1(ik)> bnEσ1 [|S|].
First, we can deduce the following inequality:
ρσ1(ib) =
1
b
b∑
k=1
ρσ1(ib)≥
1
b
b∑
k=1
ρσ1(ik)>
bEσ1 [|S|]
bn
=
Eσ1 [|S|]
n
. (EC.10)
Besides, since Vσ1 ⊆ {i1, . . . , in}, then ∀S ∈ supp(σ1), S ⊆ {i1, . . . , in} and we have the following
equality: ∀S ∈ supp(σ1), |S|=∑nk=1 1{ik∈S}. This enables us to obtain the following contradiction:
Eσ1 [|S|] =
n∑
k=1
Eσ1 [1{ik∈S}]
(EC.1)
=
b∑
k=1
ρσ1(ik) +
n∑
b+1
ρσ1(ik)>
bEσ1 [|S|]
n
+ (n− b)ρσ1(ib)
(EC.10)
> Eσ1 [|S|].
Therefore, ∀b∈ J1, nK, ∑bk=1 ρσ1(ik)≤ bnEσ1 [|S|]. (EC.9) can be analogously proved. 
Lemma EC.3. Γ is strategically equivalent to the game Γ˜ := 〈{1,2}, (A1,A2), (−u2, u2)〉.
Proof of Lemma EC.3. Adding a term to P1’s payoff that only depends on P2’s action does
not change the NE of the game. Thus, the following transformation preserves the set of NE:
∀(S,T )∈A1×A2, u1(S,T )− |T |= F(S,T )− |T |=−u2(S,T ). (EC.11)
So Γ(b1, b2) and Γ˜(b1, b2) are strategically equivalent, and have the same set of NE Σ(b1, b2). 
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Lemma EC.4. The size of MSPs is no greater than the size of MSCs, i.e., m∗ ≤ n∗.
Proof of Lemma EC.4. Consider an MSP Tmax = {e1, . . . , em∗} ∈ M and an MSC Smin =
{i1, . . . , in∗} ∈ S. Then, we have the desired inequality:
m∗
(11)
=
m∗∑
l=1
F(Smin, el)
(EC.6)
≤
m∗∑
l=1
n∗∑
k=1
F(ik, el) =
n∗∑
k=1
m∗∑
l=1
F(ik, el)
(EC.7)
=
n∗∑
k=1
F(ik, T
max)
(12)
≤ n∗.

EC.2. Proofs of Section 3
Lemma EC.5. Consider a set of nodes S = {i1, . . . , in} ∈ 2V of size n≥ b1, and a set of components
T = {e1, . . . , em} ∈ 2E of size m≥ b2. We define the following pure actions:
∀k ∈ J1, nK, Sk ={ {ik, . . . , ik+b1−1} if k≤ n− b1 + 1,{ik, . . . , in, i1, . . . , ik+b1−n−1} if k≥ n− b1 + 2, (EC.12)
∀l ∈ J1,mK, T l ={ {el, . . . , el+b2−1} if l≤m− b2 + 1,{el, . . . , em, e1, . . . , el+b2−m−1} if l≥m− b2 + 2, (EC.13)
and a strategy profile (σ1(S, b1), σ
2(T, b2)) ∈ ∆(A1) × ∆(A2) supported over {S1, . . . , Sn} and
{T 1, . . . , Tm}, where:
∀k ∈ J1, nK, σ1(S, b1)Sk := 1n, (EC.14)
∀l ∈ J1,mK, σ2(T, b2)T l := 1m. (EC.15)
Then, the strategy profile (σ1(S, b1), σ
2(T, b2)) has the following properties:
(i) Each node in S (resp. each component in T ) is inspected (resp. targeted) with an identical
probability given by:
∀i∈ S, ρσ1(S,b1)(i) =
b1
n
, (EC.16)
∀e∈ T, ρσ2(T,b2)(e) =
b2
m
. (EC.17)
(ii) Each node in S (resp. each component in T ) belongs to b1 actions (resp. b2 actions) in the
support of σ1(S, b1) (resp. σ
2(T, b2)):
∀i∈ S, |{k ∈ J1, nK | i∈ Sk}|= b1, (EC.18)
∀e∈ T, |{l ∈ J1,mK | e∈ T l}|= b2. (EC.19)
(iii) The following inequality is satisfied:
∀e∈ E , F(S, e)≤ 1
b1
n∑
k=1
F(Sk, e). (EC.20)
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Proof of Lemma EC.5. We show the result for a set of nodes S = {i1, . . . , in} ∈ 2V of size n≥ b1.
First we note, by construction, that each node il, l ∈ J1, nK belongs to the same number of
detector positionings Sk, k ∈ J1, nK. Thus, (EC.18) follows from the following calculations:
nb1
(EC.12)
=
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈V
1{i∈Sk} =
∑
i∈V
|{k ∈ J1, nK | i∈ Sk}= n× |{k ∈ J1, nK | i∈ Sk}|, ∀i∈ S.
Then, we can show (EC.16). For every node i∈ S, we have:
ρσ1(S,b1)(i)
(EC.1)
=
n∑
k=1
σ1(S, b1)Sk1{i∈Sk}
(EC.14)
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
1{i∈Sk} =
1
n
|{k ∈ J1, nK | i∈ Sk}| (EC.18)= b1
n
.
An analogous proof can be applied to T ∈ 2E of size m≥ b2 to show (EC.17) and (EC.19).
Finally, let us show (EC.20). Consider e∈ E . If F(S, e) = 1, then ∃ i0 ∈ S | F(i0, e) = 1. Since there
are b1 detector positionings in {Sk, k ∈ J1, nK} that contain i0, then 1b1 ∑nk=1 F(Sk, e)≥ 1 = F(S, e).
If F(S, e) = 0, then ∀i∈ S, F(i, e) = 0 and 1
b1
∑n
k=1 F(S
k, e) = 0. 
We illustrate this construction with an example:
Example EC.1. Consider a set of three nodes S = {i1, i2, i3} and suppose that P1 has two detec-
tors (b1 = 2). First, we define three pure actions S
1 = {i1, i2}, S2 = {i2, i3}, and S3 = {i3, i1}; see
Fig. EC.1. The strategy σ1(S, b1) is then obtained by assigning uniform probability (i.e.,
1
3
) to each
pure action. One can check that each node in S is inspected with probability 2
3
= b1|S| .
i1
i2
i3
i1
i2
i3
i1
i2
i3
i1
i2
i3
S S1 S2 S3
Figure EC.1 Support of σ1(S, b1) when S is composed of three nodes and b1 = 2.
4
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that (i) given a minimal set cover S′ ∈ 2V , the optimal value
of (LPS′) is b2
(
b1
|S′| − 1
)
, and an optimal solution is given by σ1(S′, b1). Then, we show that (ii)
given a set packing T ′ ∈ 2E of size at least b2, the optimal value of (LPT ′) is max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1|T ′|
)}
,
and an optimal solution is given by σ2(T ′, b2).
(i) Consider a minimal set cover S′ = {i1, . . . , in} ∈ 2V of size n. Necessarily, S′ is such that:
∀k ∈ J1, nK, ∃ek ∈ E | F(ik, ek) = 1 and F(ij, ek) = 0, ∀j 6= k. (EC.21)
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– First, let us show that max{σ1∈∆(A1) | Vσ1⊆S′}minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ) ≥ b2
(
b1
n
− 1). Consider
σ1(S′, b1) ∈∆(A1) defined in (EC.14). Recall that σ1(S′, b1) is such that Vσ1(S′,b1) = S′ and ∀k ∈J1, nK, ρσ1(S′,b1)(ik) = b1n . Also, recall that we are in the case when b1 <n∗, implying that b1 <n∗ ≤ n.
Since S′ is a set cover, then ∀e∈ E , ∃ke ∈ J1, nK | F(ike , e) = 1. Furthermore, F is a nonnegative
function. Therefore:
∀e∈ E ,
∑
S∈A1
σ1(S′, b1)S F(S, e)
(EC.4)
≥
∑
{S∈A1 | ike∈S}
σ1(S′, b1)S
(EC.1)
= ρσ1(S′,b1)(ike)
(EC.16)
=
b1
n
. (EC.22)
Thus, we obtain:
∀T ∈A2, −U2(σ1(S′, b1), T ) (3)=
∑
S∈A1
σ1(S′, b1)S F(S,T )− |T | (EC.7)=
∑
e∈T
∑
S∈A1
σ1(S′, b1)S F(S, e)− |T |
(EC.22)
≥
∑
e∈T
b1
n
− |T |=
(
b1
n
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
|T |︸︷︷︸
≤b2
≥ b2
(
b1
n
− 1
)
. (EC.23)
Therefore, max{σ1∈∆(A1) | Vσ1⊆S′}minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T )≥minT∈A2−U2(σ1(S′, b1), T )≥ b2
(
b1
n
− 1) .
– Now, let us show the reverse inequality. Consider any σ1 ∈ ∆(A1) such that Vσ1 ⊆ S′ =
{i1, . . . , in}. Let us reorder the indices such that ρσ1(i1)≤ · · · ≤ ρσ1(in).
Consider T ′ = {e1, . . . , eb2} (where the ek’s are defined in (EC.21)). Then, for every k ∈ J1, b2K:
Eσ1 [F(S, ek)]
(EC.21)
=
∑
{S∈A1 | ik∈S}
σ1SF(S, ek)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
∑
{S∈A1 | ik /∈S}
σ1S F(S, ek)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(EC.1)
= ρσ1(ik), (EC.24)
where we combined the fact that the node basis of σ1 is a subset of S′ and that ik is the only node
from S′ that monitors component ek (by construction). This implies that:
min
T∈A2
−U2(σ1, T )≤−U2(σ1, T ′) (3)= Eσ1 [F(S,T ′)]− |T ′| (EC.7),(EC.24)=
b2∑
k=1
ρσ1(ik)− b2
(EC.8)
≤ b2
(
b1
n
− 1
)
.
This upper bound holds for any σ1 ∈ ∆(A1) such that Vσ1 ⊆ S′, and does not depend on σ1.
Therefore, max{σ1∈∆(A1) | Vσ1⊆S′}minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T )≤ b2
(
b1
n
− 1), and we can conclude that:
max
{σ1∈∆(A1) | Vσ1⊆S′}
min
T∈A2
−U2(σ1, T ) = min
T∈A2
−U2(σ1(S′, b1), T ) = b2
(
b1
n
− 1
)
.
The optimal value of (LPS′) is b2
(
b1
n
− 1), and an optimal solution is given by σ1(S′, b1).
(ii) Consider a set packing T ′ = {e1, . . . , em} ∈ 2E of size m≥ b2.
Case 1: If b1 ≥m, then P1 can monitor all the components of T ′ with a single detector posi-
tioning S′. Therefore, the optimal value of (LPT ′) in this case is equal to 0 = max{0, b2(1− b1m )}.
Case 2: Consider b1 <m. In this case, note that max{0, b2(1− b1m )}= b2(1− b1m ).
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– First, we show that max{σ2∈∆(A2) | Eσ2⊆T ′}minS∈A1 U2(S,σ
2)≥ b2
(
1− b1
m
)
. Consider σ2(T ′, b2) ∈
∆(A2) defined in (EC.15). Since T ′ is a set packing, then ∀i∈ V, F(i, T ′)≤ 1. This implies that:
∀S ∈A1, U2(S,σ2(T ′, b2)) (3)= Eσ2(T ′,b2) [|T | −F(S,T )]
(EC.6),(EC.13)
≥ b2−
∑
i∈S
Eσ2(T ′,b2) [F(i, T )]
(EC.7),(EC.2)
= b2−
∑
i∈S
∑
e∈E
F(i, e)ρσ2(T ′,b2)(e)
(EC.17),(EC.7)
= b2− b2
m
∑
i∈S
F(i, T ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≥ b2
(
1− b1
m
)
.
Therefore, max{σ2∈∆(A2) | Eσ2⊆T ′}minS∈A1 U2(S,σ
2)≥minS∈A1 U2(S,σ2(T ′, b2))≥ b2
(
1− b1
m
)
.
– Now, let us show the reverse inequality. Consider any σ2 ∈∆(A2) | Eσ2 ⊆ T ′ = {e1, . . . , em}.
Let us reorder the indices such that ρσ2(e1)≥ · · · ≥ ρσ2(em). In Section 2.1, we assumed that each
component can be monitored from at least one node. Therefore ∀l ∈ J1,mK, ∃ il ∈ V | F(il, el) = 1
(note that the il’s are distinct since T
′ is a set packing). Now, consider the detector positioning
S′ = {i1, . . . , ib1}. S′ monitors {e1, . . . , eb1}, which enables us to show:
min
S∈A1
U2(S,σ
2)≤U2(S′, σ2) (3),(EC.7)= Eσ2 [|T |]−Eσ2 [
∑
e∈T
F(S′, e)]
(EC.2)
= Eσ2 [|T |]−
∑
e∈E
F(S′, e)ρσ2(e)
=Eσ2 [|T |]−
b1∑
l=1
F(S′, el)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
ρσ2(el)−
m∑
l=b1+1
F(S′, el)ρσ2(el)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(EC.9)
≤
(
1− b1
m
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Eσ2 [|T |]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤b2
≤
(
1− b1
m
)
b2.
This upper bound is valid for any σ2 ∈∆(A2) such that Eσ2 ⊆ T ′, and does not depend on σ2.
Therefore, max{σ2∈∆(A2) | Eσ2⊆T ′}minS∈A1 U2(S,σ
2)≤ b2
(
1− b1
m
)
, and we can conclude that:
max
{σ2∈∆(A2) | Eσ2⊆T ′}
min
S∈A1
U2(S,σ
2) = min
S∈A1
U2(S,σ
2(T ′, b2)) = b2
(
1− b1
m
)
.
The optimal value of (LPT ′) in this case (b1 <m) is b2
(
1− b1
m
)
= max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1
m
)}
, and an
optimal solution is given by σ2(T ′, b2). 
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i.a) First, let us show by contradiction that P1 uses all her resources in equilibrium. Suppose
that ∃ (σ1∗, σ2∗)∈Σ, ∃S0 ∈ supp(σ1∗) | |S0|< b1.
– The first step is to show that P2’s strategy σ2
∗
necessarily targets with positive probability
at least one component that is not monitored by S0. On the contrary, assume that ∀e∈ E : ρσ2∗ (e)>
0 =⇒ F(S0, e) = 1. Then, P1 can detect all the attacks of σ2∗ with the detector positioning S0.
Thus, S0 is a best response for P1 to σ2
∗
, and P2’s payoff in equilibrium is 0. Since P2’s payoff is
identical for any NE (direct consequence of Lemma EC.3), then P2’s payoff for the initial NE we
considered, (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
), is also 0. However, since b1 < n
∗, we know that ∃e′ ∈ E | F(S0, e′) = 0, i.e.,
e′ is not monitored by S0. Since S0 ∈ supp(σ1∗), then e′ is not monitored with positive probability.
Therefore, if P2 targets e′, she will get a positive payoff, which contradicts the equilibrium condition
(5) for (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
). Therefore, ∃e0 ∈ E | ρσ2∗ (e0)> 0 and F(S0, e0) = 0.
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– Now, we can show that P1 can increase her payoff by placing one more detector. Let us
denote i0 ∈ V\S0 that satisfies F(i0, e0) = 1. Then, by considering the detector positioning S′ =
S0∪{i0} ∈A1, we obtain that U1(S′, σ2∗)≥ ρσ2∗ (e0) +U1(S0, σ2
∗
)>U1(S
0, σ2
∗
), which violates the
equilibrium condition (4) for (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
). Therefore, ∀S ∈ supp(σ1∗), |S|= b1.
(i.b) Now, let us show that P2 uses all her resources in equilibrium. By contradiction, suppose
that ∃ (σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ, ∃T 0 ∈ supp(σ2∗) | |T 0|< b2.
– The first step is to show that there exists a component e′ not in T 0 that is not monitored
by every detector positioning in the support of σ1
∗
. Let us assume the contrary, i.e., that ∀S ∈
supp(σ1
∗
), ∀e /∈ T 0, F(S, e) = 1. First, let us denote T 1 ⊆ T 0 the subset of components of T 0 that are
unmonitored by at least one detector positioning S ∈ supp(σ1∗), i.e., T 1 :=⋃S∈supp(σ1∗ )(E\CS)⊆ T 0.
For all S ∈ supp(σ1∗), let kS denote the number of components of T 1 that are not monitored by
S. Since every component outside of T 1 is monitored by every detector positioning in the support
of σ1
∗
, then P2’s best response to σ1
∗
is any attack plan T ∈ A2 such that T 1 ⊆ T (note that
|T 1| ≤ b2), and P2’s equilibrium payoff is equal to k∗ :=Eσ1∗ [kS]. Thus, P1’s equilibrium payoff in
the zero-sum game Γ˜ is equal to −k∗. From Proposition 1, we know that −k∗ ≥ b2
(
b1
n∗ − 1
)
. Since
we are in the case when b2 <m
∗, and we have m∗ ≤ n∗ (Lemma EC.4), then we obtain:
k∗ ≤ b2
n∗
(n∗− b1)< m
∗
n∗
(n∗− b1)≤ n∗− b1. (EC.25)
Consider S ∈ supp(σ1∗). We know that S leaves kS network components unmonitored, that we
denote e1, . . . , ekS . For l ∈ J1, kSK, let il be a node from where a detector can monitor component el.
Then, S ∪{i1, . . . , ikS} is a set cover (of size at most b1 + kS). By definition of n∗, we deduce that
b1 + kS ≥ n∗. Therefore, ∀S ∈ supp(σ1∗), kS ≥ n∗− b1. This last result implies that k∗ =Eσ1∗ [kS]≥
n∗− b1, which contradicts (EC.25). Thus, ∃ (e′, S′)∈ E\T 0× supp(σ1∗) | F(S′, e′) = 0.
– Now, we can show that P2 can increase her payoff by targeting component e′ and the
components in T 0. Let T ′ = T 0 ∪ {e′} ∈ A2 (since |T 0| < b2). Then, we get U2(σ1∗ , T ′) ≥ σ1∗S′ +
U2(σ
1∗ , T 0)>U2(σ
1∗ , T 0), which is a contradiction. Therefore, ∀T ∈ supp(σ2∗), |T |= b2.
(ii) Finally, we show that P1’s strategies in equilibrium are the optimal solutions of (LP1). First,
from (i), we can deduce that the set of optimal solutions of (LP1) is a subset of ∆(A1). Therefore,
the equilibrium inspection strategies are the optimal solutions of maxσ1∈∆(A1) minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ).
Now, consider an inspection strategy σ1 ∈ ∆(A1). Since A2 ⊆ A2, then we trivially have
minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ) ≤ minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ). To obtain the reverse inequality, let T 0 ∈ A2 be an
attack plan that satisfies T 0 ∈ arg minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ). Then, consider T ′ ∈A2 | T 0 ⊆ T ′. We can
deduce that minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ) =−U2(σ1, T 0)≥−U2(σ1, T ′)≥minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ).
Therefore, ∀σ1 ∈ ∆(A1), minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ) = minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ), which implies that
maxσ1∈∆(A1) minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ) = maxσ1∈∆(A1) minT∈A2−U2(σ1, T ). Furthermore, ∀(σ1, T ) ∈
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∆(A1)×A2,−U2(σ1, T ) (EC.11)= U1(σ1, T )− b2. Thus, the equilibrium inspection strategies are the
optimal solutions of (LP1). An analogous proof can be applied to show that the equilibrium attack
strategies are the optimal solutions of (LP2). 
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) We show the result by contradiction, that is, suppose that ∃ (σ1∗, σ2∗) ∈Σ such that Vσ1∗ is
not a set cover. For simplicity, we introduce the following notation:
∀e∈ E , ησ1∗ (e) :=Eσ1∗ [F(S, e)], (EC.26)
Let us sort the components in nondecreasing order of monitoring probability: ησ1∗ (e1)≤ ησ1∗ (e2)≤
· · · ≤ ησ1∗ (e|E|). Then, T ′ = {e1, . . . , eb2} is a best response to σ1
∗
for P2 (recall that P2 uses all
her resources; see Proposition 2). Let T 0 = {e1, . . . , ek} ∈ 2E denote the components that are not
monitored by any detector positioning S ∈ supp(σ1∗). Then, ησ1∗ (e1) = · · ·= ησ1∗ (ek) = 0, and P2’s
equilibrium payoff is:
U2(σ
1∗ , T ′)
(3)
= |T ′| −Eσ1∗ [F(S,T ′)]
(EC.7),(EC.26)
= b2−
∑
e∈T ′
ησ1∗ (e) = b2−
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei). (EC.27)
Thus, P1’s equilibrium payoff in the game Γ˜ is −b2 +
∑b2
i=k+1 ησ1∗ (ei). Now, to show the contra-
diction, we construct another strategy σ̂1 that will provide a better payoff than σ1
∗
to P1.
– Case 1: k≥ b2. Then P1’s equilibrium payoff in Γ˜ is −b2 (it corresponds to zero detections).
However, she has an incentive to switch her strategy, and by randomizing over the nodes that can
monitor the k components in T 0, she will increase her payoff; which is a contradiction.
– Case 2: k < b2. Then P2 will randomize over attack plans that contain T
0.
- Case 2.1: k ≥ b1. Then P1’s equilibrium payoff in Γ˜ is at least equal to b1 − b2 (since she
can monitor b1 components in T
0 that are always targeted). This implies that P2’s equilibrium
payoff is at most b2− b1. However, thanks to Proposition 1, we know that P2’s equilibrium payoff
is larger than or equal to b2− b1b2m∗ > b2− b1 (since b2 <m∗). Therefore there is a contradiction.
- Case 2.2: k < b1. Then, the idea is to construct another strategy that position k detectors
to monitor the components in T 0 (that were previously unmonitored), and that randomizes the
positioning of the remaining b1− k detectors over the node basis of σ1∗ .
For now, assume that P1 has b1−k detectors. For any detector positioning S ∈ supp(σ1∗) (viewed
as a set of nodes), we consider σ1(S, b1−k) defined in (EC.14) (in this case, we randomize the place-
ment of b1− k detectors over the set S of size b1). Recall that supp(σ1(S, b1− k)) = {S1, . . . , Sb1},
and that ∀l ∈ J1, b1K, σ1(S, b1− k)Sl = 1b1 . Now, let us construct the following inspection strategy:
σ1
′
=
∑
S∈supp(σ1∗ )
σ1
∗
S σ
1(S, b1− k). (EC.28)
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One can check that σ′ ∈∆(A1), and is such that supp(σ1′) =∪S∈supp(σ1∗ ){S1, . . . , Sb1}. Thus, σ1
′
is a probability distribution that randomizes over detector positionings of size b1− k. Then, ∀S ∈
supp(σ1
′
), we augment S by placing k additional detectors to monitor the subset of components
T 0 that was previously unmonitored and that is always targeted in equilibrium by P2. We denote
{i1, . . . , ik} the placement of such additional detectors, and we denote Ŝ = S ∪ {i1, . . . , ik}, ∀S ∈
supp(σ1
′
) the augmented detector positioning. Then, we consider the probability distribution σ̂1
with support equal to ∪S∈supp(σ1∗ ){Ŝ1, . . . , Ŝb1} and such that:
∀S ∈ supp(σ1′), σ1′S = σ̂1Ŝ, (EC.29)
i.e., σ̂1 is the same probability distribution as σ1
′
except that it randomizes over the augmented
detector positionings present in the support of σ1
′
.
Then, we can derive the following calculations which combine the previous construction of σ̂1
with a property of the detection function derived in (EC.20), and which will lead to a contradiction:
∀T ∈A2 | T 0 ⊂ T and |T |= b2, Eσ̂1 [F(S,T )] (EC.5)= Eσ̂1 [F(S,T 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=k
] +Eσ̂1 [F(S,T\T 0)]
= k+
∑
S∈supp(σ1∗ )
b1∑
l=1
σ̂1
Ŝl
F(Ŝl, T\T 0)
(EC.4),(EC.29)
≥ k+
∑
S∈supp(σ1∗ )
b1∑
l=1
σ1
′
Sl F(S
l, T\T 0)
(EC.14),(EC.28)
= k+
∑
S∈supp(σ1∗ )
b1∑
l=1
1
b1
σ1
∗
S F(S
l, T\T 0)
(EC.20)
≥ k+
∑
S∈supp(σ1∗ )
b1− k
b1
σ1
∗
S F(S,T\T 0)
(EC.7),(EC.26)
= k+
b1− k
b1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∑
e∈T\T0
ησ1∗ (e)≥ k+
b1− k
b1
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei)
=
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei) + k
(
1− 1
b1
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei)
)
. (EC.30)
From Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium payoff of P2 is at least b2− b1b2m∗ . Therefore:
U2(σ
1∗ , σ2
∗
)
(EC.27)
= b2−
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei)≥ b2−
b1b2
m∗
⇐⇒ 1
b1
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei)≤
b2
m∗
< 1,
since b2 <m
∗. Then, by combining the previous inequality with (EC.30), we obtain:
∀T ∈A2 | T 0 ⊂ T and |T |= b2, −U2(σ̂1, T )
(3),(EC.30)
> −b2 +
b2∑
i=k+1
ησ1∗ (ei)
(EC.27)
= −U2(σ1∗ , σ2∗).
Since each attack plan in the support of an equilibrium strategy uses all the resources (Propo-
sition 2), and must contain T 0 (beginning of Case 2), then: −U2(σ̂1, σ2∗) = Eσ2∗ [−U2(σ̂1, T )] >
−U2(σ1∗ , σ2∗), which violates the equilibrium condition (4) in the strategic equivalent game Γ˜.
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Therefore, ∀(σ1∗, σ2∗)∈Σ, Vσ1∗ is a set cover.
(ii) From Proposition 3 and the fact that b1 <n
∗, P1 must randomize her detector positionings
in equilibrium so the node basis is a set cover. Now, assume that there exists a NE (σ1
∗
, T ) ∈ Σ
such that P2 chooses a pure strategy T (of size b2 from Proposition 2).
– If b1 ≥ b2, then P1 can detect all the attacks in T by placing b2 detectors at the nodes that
can monitor the components of T , and P2’s equilibrium payoff would be 0. Again, since P2’s payoff
is identical for any NE, then U2(σ
1∗ , T ) = 0. However, we showed in the proof of Proposition 2
that there exists a component outside of T that is not monitored with positive probability by σ1
∗
.
Therefore, P2 can increase her payoff by targeting that component, thus leading to a contradiction.
– If b1 < b2, then P1 can detect at least b1 attacks in T by placing detectors on b1 nodes
that can collectively monitor b1 components of T . The resulting payoff for P1 in the game Γ˜ is
at least b1 − b2. However, from Proposition 1, we know that P2’s equilibrium payoff is at least
max{0, b2(1− b1m∗ )} ≥ b2(1− b1m∗ )> b2− b1 (since b2 <m∗). Therefore, P1’s equilibrium payoff in Γ˜
is strictly upper bounded by b1− b2, thus leading to a contradiction.
Therefore, in equilibrium, both players must randomize their actions. 
Proof of Theorem 1.
(i) Since P2’s expected payoff in the game Γ is also her expected payoff in Γ˜, we know that P2’s
equilibrium payoff is constant. From Proposition 1, we can directly obtain:
∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ, max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1
m∗
)}
≤U2(σ1∗ , σ2∗)≤ b2
(
1− b1
n∗
)
. (EC.31)
By combining (EC.11) and Proposition 2, we deduce that P1’s payoff in equilibrium of Γ is also
constant, and can be bounded as follows:
∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗)∈Σ, b1b2
n∗
≤U1(σ1∗ , σ2∗)≤min
{
b1b2
m∗
, b2
}
. (EC.32)
(ii) Again, thanks to Proposition 2, we have ∀σ∗ ∈ Σ, r(σ∗) (8)= Eσ∗
[
F(S,T )
|T |
]
= 1
b2
Eσ∗ [F(S,T )]
(2)
=
1
b2
U1(σ
1∗ , σ2
∗
). Therefore, from (EC.32), we obtain that the expected detection rate in equilibrium
is constant and bounded as follows: ∀σ∗ ∈Σ, b1
n∗ ≤ r(σ∗)≤min
{
b1
m∗ ,1
}
. 
Proof of Theorem 2
(i.a) Let Smin ∈ S be an MSC and Tmax ∈ M be an MSP. Then, let us show that
(σ1(Smin, b1), σ
2(Tmax, b2)) is an −NE where  = b1b2
(
1
max{b1,m∗} −
1
n∗
)
. First, note that − =
max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1
m∗
)}
+ b2
(
b1
n∗ − 1
)
. Then, we have:
∀σ1 ∈∆(A1), −U2(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))≥ min
σ2∈∆(A2)
−U2(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2)
Prop. 1
= b2
(
b1
n∗
− 1
)
=−max
{
0, b2
(
1− b1
m∗
)}
− 
Prop. 1
= − min
σ1
′∈∆(A1)
U2(σ
1′ , σ2(Tmax, b2))− ≥−U2(σ1, σ2(Tmax, b2))− . (EC.33)
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Therefore, ∀σ1 ∈∆(A1), U1(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))−U1(σ1, σ2(Tmax, b2))
(EC.33),(EC.11)
≥ −.
Analogous calculations show that U2(σ
1(Smin, b1), σ
2(Tmax, b2))≥U2(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2)− , ∀σ2 ∈
∆(A2). Therefore, we conclude that (σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))∈Σ(b1, b2).
(i.b) Again, from Proposition 1, we deduce that:
max
{
0,
(
1− b1
m∗
)
b2
}
≤U2(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))≤ b2
(
1− b1
n∗
)
.
By combining it with (EC.31), we obtain for any NE (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
)∈Σ:
|U2(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))−U2(σ1∗ , σ2∗)| ≤ b2
(
1− b1
n∗
)
−max
{
0,
(
1− b1
m∗
)
b2
}
= .
Furthermore, from (EC.11), (16), and (EC.13), we also deduce that for any NE (σ1
∗
, σ2
∗
)∈Σ:
|U1(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))−U1(σ1∗ , σ2∗)|= |U2(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2(Tmax, b2))−U2(σ1∗ , σ2∗)| ≤ .
(ii) Consider an MSC Smin ∈ S. Then we have:
∀T ∈A2, U1(σ
1(Smin, b1), T )
|T |
(EC.11)
=
−U2(σ1(Smin, b1), T )
|T | +
|T |
|T |
(EC.23)
≥ b1
n∗
. (EC.34)
Thus, by linearity of the expectation, we obtain:
∀σ2 ∈∆(A2), r(σ1(Smin, b1), σ2) (8),(2)= Eσ2
[
U1(σ
1(Smin, b1), T )
|T |
]
(EC.34)
≥ b1
n∗
.
Therefore, minσ2∈∆(A2) r(σ
1(Smin, b1), σ
2) ≥ b1
n∗ . Now, consider i
′ ∈ Smin. Recall from (EC.21)
that ∃e′ ∈ E | F(i′, e′) = 1 and F(i, e′) = 0, ∀i ∈ Smin\{i′}. Then, it is easy to see that
r(σ1(Smin, b1), e
′)
(8),(EC.1)
= ρσ1(Smin,b1)(i
′)
(EC.16)
= b1
n∗ . Therefore, minσ2∈∆(A2) r(σ
1(Smin, b1), σ
2) = b1
n∗ .
Finally, from Theorem 1, we have ∀(σ1∗ , σ2∗) ∈ Σ, r(σ1∗ , σ2∗)≤ b1
max{b1,m∗} , and we can deduce
that: max{b1,m
∗}
n∗ r(σ
1∗ , σ2
∗
)≤ b1
n∗ = minσ2∈∆(A2) r(σ
1(Smin, b1), σ
2). 
EC.3. Proofs of Section 6
Lemma EC.6. Given b2 < m
∗, let ρ ∈ [0,1]|E| that satisfies ∑e∈E ρe = b2. Then, there exists an
attack strategy σ2 ∈∆(A2) that satisfies ∀e∈ E , ρσ2(e) = ρe.
Proof of Lemma EC.6. Given b2 <m
∗, let A be the |E|× (|E|
b2
)
binary matrix whose rows (resp.
columns) are indexed by the components (resp. the size-b2 subsets) of E , and which satisfies ∀(e,T )∈
E ×A2, ae,T = 1{e∈T}. Then, given ρ ∈ [0,1]|E| that satisfies
∑
e∈E ρe = b2, we must show that the
following system of equations has a feasible solution:
Aσ2 = ρ
1T|A2|σ
2 = 1
σ2 ≥ 0|A2|.
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Since each T ∈A2 is of size b2, it is easy to see that 1b21
T
|E|A= 1
T
|A2|. Furthermore, since
1
b2
1T|E|ρ= 1,
it implies that if σ2 satisfies Aσ2 = ρ, it also satisfies 1T|A2|σ
2 = 1. Therefore, we only need to show
that there exists σ2 ≥ 0|A2| such that Aσ2 = ρ. By Farkas’ lemma, such a solution exists if and only
if there does not exist w ∈R|E| such that wTA≤ 0T|A2| and wTρ> 0.
Let w ∈ R|E| that satisfies wTA ≤ 0T|A2|, and let us order the components in E so that we1 ≥
· · · ≥ we|E| . For notational simplicity, let wk := wek and ρk := ρek , ∀k ∈ J1, |E|K. Note that since
T 1 = {e1, . . . , eb2} ∈A2, we have
∑b2
k=1wk = (w
TA)T1 ≤ 0. Then, we obtain:
wTρ=
m∑
k=1
wkρk =
b2∑
k=1
wk︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
m∑
k=b2+1
wk︸︷︷︸
≤wb2
ρk︸︷︷︸
≥0
−
b2∑
k=1
wk︸︷︷︸
≥wb2
(1− ρk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤wb2
(
m∑
k=1
ρk− b2
)
= 0.
Therefore, there does not exist w ∈ R|E| such that wTA ≤ 0T|A2| and wTρ > 0, which, by Farkas’
lemma, implies that there exists an attack strategy σ2 ∈∆(A2) such that ∀e∈ E , ρσ2(e) = ρe. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider P1’s amount of resources b1. If b1 ≥ n∗, then it is easy to see that
∀b2 <m∗, ∀σ∗ ∈Σ(b1, b2), r(σ∗) = 1. Henceforth, we assume that b1 <n∗. Recall from Proposition 2
that the NE of Γ can be obtained by solving (LP1) and (LP2).
(i) First, we show that for b2 = 1, there exists an optimal solution of (LP2), σ
2∗ ∈∆(A2), that
satisfies ∀e∈ E , ρσ2∗ (e)≤ 1m∗ . Since b2 = 1, then A2 = E , and ∀σ2 ∈∆(E), ∀e∈ E , σ2e = ρσ2(e).
– Consider an optimal solution of (LP2), σ
2∗ ∈∆(E), and assume on the contrary that ∃e′ ∈
E , ∃ε > 0 | ρσ2∗ (e′) = 1m∗ + ε. Let S∗ ∈ arg maxS∈A1 U1(S,σ2
∗
). From Prop. 1, we know that:
U1(S
∗, σ2
∗
)
(EC.11)
= −U2(S∗, σ2∗) + 1≤−max{1− b1
m∗
,0}+ 1 = min{ b1
m∗
,1} ≤ b1
m∗
. (EC.35)
Therefore, we can show that ∃ i′ ∈ S∗ | U1(S∗, σ2∗) − U1(S∗\{i′}, σ2∗) ≤ 1m∗ . Indeed, if ∀i ∈
S∗, U1(S∗, σ2
∗
)−U1(S∗\{i′}, σ2∗)> 1m∗ , then we obtain the following contradiction:
(b1− 1)U1(S∗, σ2∗)
(2),(EC.20)
≤
∑
i∈S∗
U1(S
∗\{i′}, σ2∗)< b1U1(S∗, σ2∗)− b1
m∗
(EC.35)
≤ (b1− 1)U1(S∗, σ2∗).
– This implies that e′ ∈ CS∗ : If e′ /∈ CS∗ instead, then repositioning the detector on node i′ to
a node that can monitor e′ improves P1’s payoff by at least ε and contradicts the definition of S∗.
– Then, we show that at least b1 components are monitored by S
∗. If we assume that |CS∗ |< b1,
then at least one detector in S∗ can be removed without changing P1’s payoff. Let i0 ∈ S∗ denote
the location of that detector. Now, we can show that ∃e ∈ E\{CS∗} | σ2∗e > 0: if on the contrary,
we had ∀e∈ E\{CS∗}, σ2∗e = 0, then we would obtain U1(S∗, σ2
∗
) = 1, which is contradiction: Since
b1 <n
∗, P1’s payoff in equilibrium must be strictly smaller than 1. Let e ∈ E\{CS∗} | σ2∗e > 0 and
let i ∈ V | F(i, e) = 1. Repositioning the detector from node i0 to node i will increase P1’s payoff
by at least σ2
∗
e , which contradicts the definition of S
∗. Thus, |CS∗ | ≥ b1.
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– Now, we show that we can construct σ2
′
which is the same probability distribution as σ2
∗
except that it reallocates ε probability from e′ to a subset of components T 1 monitored by S∗ while
ensuring that the attack probability of each component in T 1 is not above 1
m∗ . Let us split CS∗ into
{e′}, T 1 = {e∈ CS∗\{e′} | σ2∗e < 1m∗ }, and T 2 = {e∈ CS∗\{e′} | σ2
∗
e ≥ 1m∗ }. Now, we have:
ε
(2)
= U1(S
∗, σ2
∗
)−
∑
e∈T1∪T2
σ2
∗
e −
1
m∗
(EC.35)
≤ |CS∗ | − |T
2| − 1
m∗
−
∑
e∈T1
σ2
∗
e =
∑
e∈T1
(
1
m∗
−σ2∗e ),
which implies that T 1 6= ∅, and that it is possible to allocate ε additional probability to components
in T 1 so that the attack probability of each component in T 1 is not above 1
m∗ . Thus, σ
2′ can be
constructed. It satisfies ∀e∈ E\{T 1 ∪{e′}}, σ2′e = σ2
∗
e , σ
2′
e′ = σ
2∗
e′ − ε, and
∑
e∈T1(σ
2′
e −σ2
∗
e ) = ε.
– Now, consider S′ ∈ arg maxS∈A1 U1(S,σ2
′
). The goal of this step is to show (by contradiction)
that e′ ∈ CS′ . First, we derive the following calculations:
U1(S
′, σ2
′
)
(2)
= (σ2
∗
e′ − ε)F(S′, e′) +
∑
e∈E\{T1∪{e′}}
σ2
∗
e F(S
′, e) +
∑
e∈T1
(σ2
′
e −σ2
∗
e )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
F(S′, e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+
∑
e∈T1
σ2
∗
e F(S
′, e)
≤
∑
e∈E
σ2
∗
e F(S
′, e) +
∑
e∈T1
(σ2
′
e −σ2
∗
e )− εF(S′, e′)
(2)
= U1(S
′, σ2
∗
) + ε(1−F(S′, e′)). (EC.36)
Thus, if e′ /∈ CS′ , then U1(S′, σ2′)≤U1(S′, σ2∗) + ε. Let i∗ ∈ V\S′ | e′ ∈ Ci∗ . Then, we have:
∀i∈ S′, U1(S∗, σ2∗)≥U1({i∗}∪S′\{i}, σ2∗)
(2),(EC.4)
≥ 1
m∗
+ ε+U1(S
′\{i}, σ2∗). (EC.37)
Next, we can derive the following calculations:
U1(S
′, σ2
∗
)
(2),(EC.20)
≤ 1
b1− 1
∑
i∈S′
U1(S
′\{i}, σ2∗)
(EC.37),(EC.35)
≤ U1(S∗, σ2∗)− b1
b1− 1ε. (EC.38)
Combining everything together, we obtain the following contradiction:
max
S∈A1
U1(S,σ
2′)
(EC.36),(EC.38)
≤ U1(S∗, σ2∗)− 1
b1− 1ε <U1(S
∗, σ2
∗
) = min
σ2∈∆(E)
max
S∈A1
U1(S,σ
2).
– Therefore, we showed that e′ ∈ CS′ . This implies that ε(1− F(S′, e′)) = 0, and we obtain:
maxS∈A1 U1(S,σ
2′)
(EC.36)
≤ U1(S′, σ2∗) ≤ maxS∈A1 U1(S,σ2
∗
) = minσ2∈∆(E) maxS∈A1 U1(S,σ
2). Thus,
σ2
′
is also an optimal solution of (LP2). Therefore, if an optimal solution of (LP2) is such that at
least one component is targeted with probability more than 1
m∗ , we can create another optimal
solution of (LP2) with one less component targeted with probability more than
1
m∗ . We can then
repeat this process until all attack probabilities are no more than 1
m∗ .
(ii) Given b1 < n
∗, let z∗(b2) denote the optimal value of (LP2) for any b2 <m∗. Now, consider
b2 <m
∗, and let σ2
∗ ∈∆(A2) be an optimal solution of (LP2). Since
∑
e∈E
ρ
σ2
∗
(e)
b2
= 1, we can con-
struct an attack strategy σ2
′ ∈∆(E) such that ∀e∈ E , σ2′e = ρσ2′ (e) =
ρ
σ2
∗ (e)
b2
. Then, the additivity
of F gives us: z∗(b2) = maxS∈A1
∑
e∈E F(S, e)ρσ2∗ (e) = b2 maxS∈A1 U1(S,σ
2′)≥ b2z∗(1).
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Now, consider σ˜2 ∈ ∆(E) which is an optimal solution of (LP2) (where the number of attack
resources is 1) with the additional property that ∀e ∈ E , ρσ˜2(e)≤ 1m∗ . Then, given b2 <m∗, since
∀e ∈ E , b2ρσ˜2(e) ≤ 1 and
∑
e∈E b2ρσ˜2(e) = b2, there exists a probability distribution σ̂
2 ∈ ∆(A2),
that satisfies ρσ̂2(e) = b2ρσ˜2(e), ∀e∈ E (Lemma EC.6). Then, by additivity of F, we obtain: z∗(1) =
maxS∈A1
∑
e∈E F(S, e)ρσ˜2(e) = maxS∈A1
1
b2
∑
e∈E F(S, e)ρσ̂2(e)≥ 1b2 z∗(b2).
Thus, ∀b2 <m∗, z∗(b2) = b2z∗(1). Therefore, we conclude that ∀σ∗ ∈Σ(b1, b2), r(σ∗) (16)= U1(σ
∗)
b2
=
z∗(b2)
b2
= z∗(1) =: r∗b1 , which does not depend on b2. 
Proposition EC.1. Given P1’s number of detectors b1 <n
∗, inspection strategies in equilibrium
of the game Γ(b1,1) are also inspection strategies in equilibrium of any game Γ(b1, b2) with b2 <m
∗.
Proof of Proposition EC.1. Given P1’s resources b1 < n
∗, let σ1
∗ ∈ ∆(A1) be an inspection
strategy in equilibrium of the game Γ(b1,1). From Proposition 2, we know that σ
1∗ is an optimal
solution of (LP1) for b2 = 1. Now, consider b2 <m
∗. We can derive the following inequality:
∀T ∈A2, U1(σ1∗ , T ) (EC.7)=
∑
e∈T
U1(σ
1∗ , e)≥
∑
e∈T
min
e′∈E
U1(σ
1∗ , e′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=r∗
b1
= b2r
∗
b1
(19)
= max
σ1∈∆(A1)
min
T ′∈A2
U1(σ
1, T ′).
Since this inequality is valid for any T ∈ A2, we deduce that minT∈A2 U1(σ1
∗
, T ) ≥
maxσ1∈∆(A1) minT∈A2 U1(σ
1, T ). Therefore, σ1
∗
is an optimal solution of (LP1) (when the number
of attack resources is b2), and is an inspection strategy in equilibrium of the game Γ(b1, b2). 
EC.4. Solution Refinement
In order to refine our MSC/MSP-based solution and improve its performance guarantees, we pre-
sented in Section 6 a column generation algorithm. Given b1 <n
∗, we showed in Proposition EC.1
that inspection strategies in equilibrium of any game Γ(b1, b2) with b2 <m
∗ can be obtained by
solving (LP1) for b2 = 1. Given a subset I ⊆ A1 of indices, the master problem of the column
generation algorithm applied to (LP1) is given by:
(PCG) : maximize z
subject to z ≤
∑
S∈I
F(S, e)σ1S, ∀e∈ E∑
S∈I
σ1S = 1
σ1S ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ I.
(EC.39)
Let σ1
∗
, z∗ (resp. ρ∗e, (e∈ E), z′
∗
) denote the optimal primal (resp. dual) solution of (PCG). The
reduced cost associated with each S ∈A1 is given by
∑
e∈E F(S, e)ρ
∗
e − z′
∗
. Therefore, the detector
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positioning with the highest reduced cost can be obtained by solving a maximum weighted covering
set problem, which can be formulated as the following integer program:
(DCG) : maximize
∑
e∈E
ρ∗eye
subject to ye ≤
∑
{i∈V | e∈Ci}
xi, ∀e∈ E∑
i∈V
xi = b1
xi, ye ∈ {0,1}, ∀i∈ V, ∀e∈ E .
If the optimal value of (DCG) is no more than z
′∗ , then this proves that the optimal primal
solution of (PCG), (σ
1∗ , z∗), is also an optimal solution of (LP1). However, if the optimal value of
(DCG) is more than z
′∗ , then we add the detector positioning corresponding to the optimal solution
of (DCG) to the set of indices I. (PCG) is then solved with the new set of indices I.
This algorithm can be initiated by considering I = supp(σ1(Smin, b1)), and can be repeated until
an optimal solution of (PCG) is found. In that case, the optimal dual variables ρ
∗
e, ∀e∈ E , give the
probabilities with which each component can be targeted in equilibrium of the game Γ(b1,1). In
the proof of Theorem 3, we show how to reallocate these probabilities to create an attack strategy
in equilibrium of Γ(b1,1) with the additional property that each component is not targeted with
probability more than 1
m∗ . Then, from Lemma EC.6, given b2 < m
∗, we can obtain an attack
strategy in equilibrium of Γ(b1, b2), denoted σ
2 ∈∆(A2), by solving the linear program: Aσ2 = b2ρ∗,
and σ2 ≥ 0|A2|. This can be done by considering the following auxiliary problem:
minimize 1T|E|s
subject to Aσ2 + s= b2ρ
∗
σ2 ≥ 0|A2|, s≥ 0|E|.
This auxiliary problem can also be solved using column generation, with (σ2, s) = (0|A2|, b2ρ
∗)
as initial feasible solution. Given the current master problem generated by the column generation
algorithm, let β∗ ∈R|E| denote its optimal dual variables. Then, the index T ∗ with lowest reduced
cost is given by T ∗ ∈ arg maxT∈A2
∑
e∈T β
∗
e , i.e., T
∗ targets the components with highest values β∗e .
From Lemma EC.6, we know that at optimality, the objective value is 0 (i.e., s= 0|E|) and σ2 is
an equilibrium attack strategy. In summary, given b1 < n
∗ and b2 < m∗, two column generation
algorithms can be run in order to obtain an exact NE of game Γ(b1, b2).
EC.5. Case when b2 ≥m∗
As argued in Section 3, the network inspection problem (P) when b2 ≥m∗ is of limited practical
interest. However, for the sake of completeness, we now briefly discuss this case. First, recall from
Section 3 that the optimal value of (P) is no more than n∗, since P1 can achieve any target
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detection rate when she has at least n∗ detectors; thus, we will continue to restrict our attention
to the game Γ(b1, b2) when b1 <n
∗.
To evaluate the equilibrium constraints (9)-(10), we derived in Section 3 equilibrium properties
of the game Γ(b1, b2) that hold when b1 < n
∗ and b2 <m∗. Note that all these properties, except
Prop. 3, also hold when b1 < n
∗ and b2 = m∗. This implies that Prop. 4, i.e., our (approximate)
solution for the network inspection problem (P), and Theorem 3, are still valid when b2 =m∗.
However, most of these properties are not satisfied by the NE of Γ(b1, b2) when b1 < n
∗ and
b2 >m
∗, as discussed in the following example:
Example EC.2. Consider the detection model G = (V,E ,{Ci, i ∈ V) defined as follows. Let V =
{i1, . . . , i2n}, with n∈N, and let E = E1∪{e1, . . . , en}, where E1 is a discrete set. Then, the monitoring
sets are defined by: ∀k ∈ J1, nK, Cik = E1 ∪{ek} and Cin+k = {ek}.
In this example, Smin = {i1, . . . , in} is an MSC, and Tmax = {e1, . . . , en} is an MSP; so n∗ =
m∗ = n. Given any b1 < n and any b2 ∈ Jn, |E1| + nK, one can check that ∀T ∈ A2 | Tmax ⊆
T, ({i1, . . . , ib1}, T ) is a pure NE, whose node basis is not a set cover. Therefore, Prop. 3 does not
hold anymore.
Now, if we consider b2 = |E1|+n, we just showed that we could construct NE where P2 can use
n,n+1, . . . , or n+ |E1|= b2 resources. Thus, (16) in Prop. 2 does not hold anymore. This also implies
that P1’s payoff and the expected detection rate are not constant in equilibrium anymore: We
found equilibria where P1’s payoff is equal to b1, b1 +1, . . . , b1 + |E1|. This corresponds to equilibrium
detection rates equal to b1
n
, b1+1
n+1
, . . . , b1+|E1|
n+|E1| , which violates Thm. 3. Since
b1+|E1|
n+|E1| −→|E1|→+∞ 1, the
upper bound on the expected detection rates given by Thm. 1 is violated. Furthermore, the bound
derived in Thm. 2 is not valid anymore. By choosing σ1(Smin, b1), the expected detection rate may
be arbitrarily far from an equilibrium expected detection rate: we can only trivially bound the
difference with 1− b1
n∗ . 4
Still, some results remain valid when b1 < n
∗ and b2 >m∗: In Proposition 2, (15) still holds. In
Theorem 1, the lower bound on the equilibrium expected detection rates is still valid. In Theo-
rem 2, when choosing σ1(Smin, b1), the expected detection rate is still guaranteed to be at least
b1
n∗ , regardless of P2’s strategy. From these remaining results, we can show that b
′
1 = dαn∗e is still
a sufficient condition for the expected detection rates in equilibrium to be at least α, and provides
an upper bound on the optimal value b†1 of (P). Furthermore, given an MSC, Smin, if P1 positions
these b′1 detectors according to the inspecting strategy σ
1(Smin, b′1), she is still guaranteed to detect
a fraction α of the attacks in expectation, regardless of which strategy P2 chooses.
